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Liberty and Democracy Through the
Administrative State: A Critique of the Roberts
Court’s Political Theory
BLAKE EMERSON†
The values of liberty and democracy repeatedly arise in recent Supreme Court opinions on
administrative law. The conservative Justices have argued that the power vested in government
agencies threatens individual freedom and collective self-government. This Article critiques these
Justices’ use of political theory. It shows that the Justices do not faithfully and even-handedly
apply the complex tradition of American political thought on which they rely. They invoke several
different and competing aspects of liberty and democracy to criticize the administrative state. But
because the Justices do not disentangle the various aspects of these two values from one another,
they draw faulty inferences about how best to protect them. Furthermore, they do not
acknowledge the ways in which properly structured administrative power promotes liberty and
democracy. They thereby aggrandize judicial power at the expense of the elected branches
without effectively promoting individual autonomy.
This Article argues for a more rigorous, tailored, and nuanced application of the values of liberty
and democracy in public law. It demonstrates that the Court should not rely on these values to
justify constitutional rules concerning the balance between legislative and executive power.
Because liberty and democracy each have multiple and competing dimensions, it is difficult if not
impossible in these contexts for the Court to draw firm, generalizable conclusions about how
these values on the whole will best be advanced. Even where certain liberty or democracy
interests may be put at risk by legislative delegation to the executive or by legislative insulation
of agencies from presidential control, such arrangements at the same time promote other aspects
of these same values. The Court would be justified in tailoring judicial deference so as to protect
procedural fairness, which falls within the judiciary’s core institutional competence. Ultimately,
however, the Court should not have exclusive or even primary custody over the meaning and
application of liberal and democratic values. It should be a task for the people and the elected
branches to safeguard these values in the structures and purposes of government.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has the administrative state in its crosshairs. Supported
by a chorus of scholars,1 Justices on the Court’s conservative wing have argued
that administrative agencies wield unconstitutional or unlawful authority.
Among the targets of this critique are agencies’ authority to make binding
regulations, to interpret law, and to operate without direct presidential control.2
Such arguments turn on claims about the original public meaning of the
Constitution as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. According to this line
of attack, administrative agencies contravene clear textual requirements
concerning the distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial power.3
There is another strand of argument, however, that is squarely focused on
political theory rather than textual meaning. The conservative Justices explicitly
reinforce their criticism of administrative agencies with normative judgments
concerning the proper allocation of rights, obligations, and powers amongst
citizens and state institutions.4 For instance, in Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau,5 the Court ruled that Congress had infringed upon
the President’s constitutional authority by providing that he could not remove
the Bureau’s single Director at will.6 In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice
Roberts emphasized that “liberty”7 was endangered by the Bureau’s independent
Director, who could “bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions of
private citizens and businesses.”8 Roberts also focused on the value of popular

1. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994);
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of
the United States?”, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018); Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency
Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2011); Aditya Bamzai, The
Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021); United States v. Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021);
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 126 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Seila Law, LLC. v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S.
Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); 5 U.S.C. § 706; Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
4. By “conservative Justices”, I mean Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Clarence
Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Neil Gorsuch, as well the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, all of whom were appointed by Republican presidents, and all of
whom have contributed to the “anti-administrative” jurisprudence identified by Professor Gillian Metzger. See
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Forward, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). While Justice Amy Coney Barrett may turn out to fall in this category as
well, she was not a member of the Court when the major cases discussed in the Article were decided.
“Conservative” is an imperfect description for these justices since much of this jurisprudence aims to upend
rather than preserve longstanding public law doctrines and governance arrangements.
5. 140 S. Ct. 2183.
6. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2201.
7. Id. at 2202.
8. Id.
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rule, arguing that agencies must be controlled by the President in part because
he is “the most democratic and politically accountable official in government.”9
Other scholars have noted the turn to political theory on the Roberts Court
and the federal bench more broadly.10 Jon D. Michaels identifies an emergent
ethos in which judges act not as neutral umpires but rather as “intellectual
partisans in the collective project of constitutional governance.”11 This trend has
been especially pronounced in administrative law. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule observe that the conservative majority on the Roberts Court aims to
limit agencies’ discretion on the supposed basis of principles of “political
morality.”12 Kristin E. Hickman has also focused on the “constitutional
symbolism” involved in decisions concerning the delegation of legislative
power, which appeals to “perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of
government.”13
This attention to questions about political legitimacy is welcome. I have
argued elsewhere that administrative law raises and is capable of addressing
essential questions about democratic self-government.14 It is to the conservative
Justices’ credit that they have surfaced the implications of the administrative
state for the longstanding commitments of our constitutional culture. They are
reaching back behind the formal strictures of originalism to acknowledge the
substantive political values that underlie their decisions.
The problem is that the Justices’ reasoning from these values has been
unsuccessful and damaging to the integrity of public law. As Gillian E. Metzger
has noted, the political theory of the Court has been “one-sided.”15 The
9. Id. at 2203.
10. See Anya Bernstein & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV. 283, 284 (diagnosing a
trend of “judicial populism” which “insists that there are clear, correct answers to complex, debatable problems.
It disparages mediation that characterize democratic institutions and rejects the messiness inherent in a pluralistic
democracy”).
11. Jon D. Michaels, Baller Judges, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 411, 414 (2020).
12. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8, 19–37 (2020); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unitary Executive: Past,
Present, and Future, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 86 (2021).
13. Kristin Hickman, Nondelegation as Constitutional Symbolism, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (on file with author) (manuscript at 52). For a critique of rhetorical excess in judicial opinion writing, see
Nina Varsava, Professional Irresponsibility and Judicial Opinions, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 101 (2021).
14. See BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
DEMOCRACY 150 (2019) (“administrative power is legitimate to the extent that it enables us to be free, in the
sense of determining our own commitments and plans. In a context of deep social interdependency, such freedom
requires jointly authoring shared norms, and turning those norms into shared social conditions. The structure of
administrative power is then to be judged by its ability to facilitate rational deliberation over the meaning of
public norms that are presumptively valid, yet not fully specified. The purpose of administrative power is to
make these norms efficacious elements of the social world.”). See generally Blake Emerson, Administrative
Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L.
REV. 2019, 2024 (2018) (arguing that the major questions doctrine is grounded in concerns about democratic
legitimacy and relying on democratic theory to argue for the limitation and reform of the doctrine).
15. Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 71 (2019); see
JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 54–57
(2017).
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conservative justices have an “anti-administrative” mentality that is attuned to
the risks but not the benefits of administrative power.16 The Court identifies
moral reasons to restrain government but not to enable it. We are left with what
Daniel Walters describes as an “asymmetrical” administrative law, which hems
in agencies’ authority to act in the public interest but grants them broad
discretion to decline to enforce the law.17 We hear much about how the
administrative state undermines liberty and democracy and little about how it
may preserve them.
The conservative Justices’ appeals to the values of liberty and democracy
have not been adequately contested by their moderate and progressive
colleagues. The Court’s most vocal defenders of the administrative state, Justice
Kagan and Justice Breyer, tend to wave away the conservatives’ high-altitude
critique of the regulatory state.18 They revert instead to the sort of pragmatic,
expertise-oriented analysis that has kept the administrative state afloat since the
1930s.19 But there is now a new game on the Court. Political theory is in bounds,
and all of the Justices will have to learn how to play.
This Article will provide the tools for constructive dialogue and
contestation concerning liberty and democracy in the administrative state. It
contributes to an already rich literature on the administrative state’s relationship
to these ideals,20 offering a new typology that distinguishes different
understandings that are often lumped together in the jurisprudence. My critique
of the Roberts Court’s political theory does not presume any particular,
16. Metzger, supra note 4, at 3. But see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2400 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part III.
17. See Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 484–509 (2020).
18. Michaels, supra note 11, at 428 (“[t]here has been no correspondingly forceful defense, let alone
affirmative theory, of administrative state propounded by federal judges.”). Representative in this regard are
Justice Kagan’s opinions in Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2400 and Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116 and Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2584 (2019); see also Seila Law, 140 S. Ct.
at 2226 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s opinion ignores “the
need for sound and adaptable governance.”). Id. at 2243–44 (sharply criticizing the Court’s attempt to
“extrapolate from the Constitution’s general structure (division of powers) and implicit values (liberty) a limit
on Congress’s express power to create administrative bodies” and its “lack of interest in how agencies work”).
A notable exception is Judge Pillard’s opinion in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2019); see discussion infra Part I.A.
19. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 24 (1938). On the dominant strand of
“administrative pragmatism” in the scholarship, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law,
133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 875–81 (2020).
20. On liberty, see, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 617
(1926); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative
Law, 82 U. CHI. L REV. 393, 398 (473). On democracy, see, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1985); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114, HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255, 2269, 2331–39 (2001); Miriam Seifter, Second-Order
Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300 (2016); JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED
ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT (2018); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration,
98 TEX. L. REV. 265 (2019).
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philosophically justified conception of these values. Rather, the argument relies
on the working understandings that are already at play within the case law. It
holds the Justices to the terms of the political theory they have marshalled in
defense of their holdings. This political theory has deep roots in American legal
thought. It contains enduring, attractive, and widely shared intuitions about how
to structure government. But the Justices’ use of this theory has been
inconsistent, opportunistic, and even confused, thus creating serious distortions
in public law.
The conservative Justices use liberty in several different ways, to mean
either a power of uncoerced decision, a capacity to act rationally in light of clear
and stable rules, or the ability to contest and control the making of the rules.
They invoke democracy to refer either to the founding moment when the people
created the Constitution, to legislation by elected representatives, or to the
execution of law by the elected President. The Justices rely on these various
distinct meanings to argue in favor of changes to existing law, namely tightening
restrictions on legislative delegation, narrowing judicial deference to agency
statutory interpretation, or broadening presidential power to remove executive
officers. But they do not keep track of the different aspects of liberty and
democracy at issue in each case. They then draw faulty inferences about how
each of these aspects will be advanced or undermined.
Consider, for instance, the question of the balance between legislative and
executive power in the control of the administrative state. The conservative
Justices emphasize the democratic significance of legislation in cases about
Congress’s delegation of policymaking power to the executive, such as Gundy
v. United States.21 They argue that such delegation undermines the people’s
control over government.22 By contrast, in cases about the President’s power to
remove executive officers, such as Seila Law,23 they emphasize the President’s
democratic credentials, arguing that Congress cannot interfere with the
President’s popular warrant to control the administration of federal law.24 In
determining the proper scope of the President’s administrative powers, however,
the Justices do not grapple with the competing democratic authority of Congress
to structure the Executive Branch. Nor do they consider the democratic harms
that would result from the unelected Court’s invalidation of the elected
Legislature’s design choices. The cumulative effect of this selective and
inconsistent emphasis on different aspects of democracy is not to enhance
popular control but rather to increase the Court’s own—largely nondemocratic—power.

21. 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas J.).
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (Roberts, C.J., opinion for the Court, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, JJ.).
24. See infra Part III.A.
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Properly structured administrative power may advance rather than
undermine the sorts of liberty and democracy interests the Court has identified.
The legislative creation and presidential superintendence of agencies can further
democratic legitimacy. Administrative regulation can give people clear rules by
which to pursue their individual plans. Public participation in agency
policymaking can enable the people to contest and influence the norms by which
they are governed. The people experience liberty and practice democracy
through, rather than against, the administrative state.
A Legal Realist might think this close examination of the Roberts Court’s
political theory is a waste of time. Perhaps liberty and democracy are not
efficacious concepts in the Court’s decisionmaking, but rather rhetorical
flourishes that merely bedazzle a politically motivated result. There are certainly
some cases where such skepticism is warranted, as when the Justices do not
consider an obvious tension between the Executive’s democratic credentials and
the Legislature’s.25 There is reason to suspect in these instances that the values
are not guiding and constraining the reasoning so much as giving a high-minded
gloss to a result determined by factional interests and raw political power. But
even if the Justices are unlikely to change their ultimate conclusions in these
matters, flaws in judicial reasoning concerning freedom and self-government
should not go unanswered. The Roberts Court owes our political morality greater
care than it has shown to date.
There are other controversies, however, in which the conservative Justices’
reliance on political theory seems central to their reasoning. This seems to be the
case, in particular, when Justice Gorsuch criticizes judicial deference to
agencies’ legal interpretations for leaving people “unsure what the law is” and
thus undermining their rational liberty to make plans in light of the rules.26 While
Gorsuch is right to identify such problems with retroactive agency
policymaking, he fails to acknowledge the ways in which current deference
doctrines in fact increase legal predictability relative to the system of de novo
review he advocates.27 In these and other instances, pointing out errors in the
Justices’ reasoning may convince them to amend their conclusions so as to better
advance the value in question.
While focusing on the Roberts Court’s political theory, this argument
points beyond judicial doctrine and into the realms of legislative, administrative,
and popular constitutionalism.28 As an “exemplar of public reason,” the Court
conveys to citizens the basic commitments of our political system and models
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2437 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see infra Parts III.C., IV.A.
27. See infra Parts III.C, IV.A.
28. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and the Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Larry D.
Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 958 (2004); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and
Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 800
(2010).
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rational discourse concerning those values.29 Even though most people are not
likely to read opinions, the central role of the Court in our public life means that
the Justices’ way of defining problems is likely also to seep into political
consciousness by way of legal scholarship and news media. The Justices,
therefore, owe the public a balanced assessment of how our structures of
government protect as well as risk liberty and democracy.
If the Court proves unwilling or unable to give such faithful consideration,
we should be candid about that failure and seek out other venues to implement
fundamental political commitments. Legal scholars and the people themselves
will have to look beyond the judicial branch, and towards the legislative and
administrative process, to develop a public law that adequately protects and
expresses individual freedom and collective power. Scholars and citizens will
need to reclaim our stake in a legal and political vocabulary that the Court has
misappropriated and misused.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I shows how the values of liberty
and democracy have arisen in cases concerning official removal, legislative
delegation, and judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. This survey
reveals that the Justices have more than one meaning in mind with respect to
each of those values and that these meanings are often in tension with one
another. Part II identifies three different understandings of liberty and
democracy: discretionary liberty, rational liberty, and political liberty; and
constitutive democracy, legislative democracy, and executive democracy. I
articulate these understandings with the help of political theory as well as the
historical development of American public law. Part III deploys this framework
to critique the Court’s jurisprudence. It shows that the conservative Justices have
falsely assumed executive democracy reliably promotes discretionary liberty.
They have failed to acknowledge the tensions between legislative and executive
democracy, and between rational and discretionary liberty, in the authorization
and limitation of administrative powers. Part IV shows how administrative law
currently promotes rational and political liberty and suggests how it could be
reformed to protect these values further. First, the Court would be well-justified
to reserve judicial deference for agency policies that are prospective rather than
retroactive in their coercive effect in order to protect individuals’ rational liberty.
Second, the elected branches could address the legitimate liberty concerns raised
in the nondelegation jurisprudence by expanding opportunities for public
involvement in agency policymaking.
I. LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC LAW
This Part introduces the Court’s administrative law discourse on liberty and
democracy. It shows how the conservative Justices repeatedly invoke liberty and
democracy—often in conjunction with one another—in opinions concerning the

29. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (2005).
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administrative state. They appear to use each of these terms in different ways,
resulting in unexplained inconsistencies within the case law. The conflicts
within the jurisprudence motivate a rational reconstruction of the Court’s
underlying political theory in the next Part.
A. REMOVAL
Within structural constitutional law, the link between liberty and
democracy emerged in the late Justice Scalia’s landmark dissent in Morrison v.
Olson.30 That case concerned the constitutionality of a statute which provided
that a Special Counsel with investigatory powers could only be removed by the
Attorney General for “good cause.”31 In challenging the constitutionality of this
provision as an intrusion on the President’s constitutional power to control the
Executive Branch, Scalia observed: “The purpose of . . . the unitary
Executive . . . was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve
individual freedom.”32 He argued that presidential control over prosecution
would prevent the abuse of discretion because “[t]he President is directly
dependent on the people, and since there is only one President, he is responsible.
The people know whom to blame” if subordinate executive officials misuse their
power.33
A similar logic was on display in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accountability Oversight Board,34 where the Court held that Congress could not
insulate administrative officers by two layers of for-cause removal protection.
Part of the reason Roberts offered for this conclusion was the need to enforce
the people’s grip on the administrative apparatus: “Our Constitution was
adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected leaders.
The growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches
almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the
Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”35
This emphasis on popular control shaded into a concern for liberty.
Rejecting Justice Breyer’s emphasis on forms of political and managerial control
other than removal, Roberts quipped that “the Framers did not rest our liberties
on such bureaucratic minutiae.”36 It is not immediately obvious, however, what
Roberts meant by “our liberties” here. He might have meant the various legal
30. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
31. Id. at 657–58.
32. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
33. Id. at 729.
34. 561 U.S. 477.
35. Id. at 499; see also Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987–88 (holding that Administrative Patent Judges’ final
decisional authority is incompatible, under the Appointments Clause, with their appointment to an inferior office
by a principal officer); Id. at 1979 (“[T]housands of officers wield executive power on behalf of the President in
the name of the United States. That power acquires its legitimacy and accountability to the public through a clear
and effective chain of command down from the President, on whom all the people vote.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
36. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 500.
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rights that each individual holds, such as rights of property, speech, or religious
exercise. Or he might have been referring to the rights that we the people hold
to determine how the government acts. Or did he mean both?
Similar ambiguities arose in Seila Law, where the Court found it was
unconstitutional for Congress to limit the President’s power to remove the single
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.37 To reach that
conclusion, Roberts distinguished sharply between the legislative and executive
power where liberty was concerned. On the one hand, “[t]he Framers viewed the
[legislature] as a special threat to individual liberty,” and therefore bifurcated it
into two chambers.38 Matters were quite different when it came to the Executive:
“the Framers deemed an energetic executive essential to . . . ’the security of
liberty.’”39 The President’s power could not itself be left uncontrolled, however.
To “justify and check” his power, “the Framers made the President the most
democratic and politically accountable official in government.”40 Roberts then
summarized the overarching liberal-democratic structure, stating that “the
resulting constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere
except for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to the
people through regular elections.”41
Nothing about this is “straightforward.” Democracy justifies and restrains
the President’s power but seems to play no role in relation to the elected
legislature. It remains unclear why electoral representation only enters in to
strengthen the hand of the executive but not that of the legislature. Liberty,
likewise, cuts against legislative power but towards executive power. Liberty
seemed to be at risk in the structure of the CFPB in part because “the CFPB
Director has authority to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions
of private citizens and businesses.”42 Following Scalia in Morrison, Roberts
assumed that the President’s democratic accountability would shield liberty
against governmental abuse, whereas the legislature’s democratic accountability
would generally threaten liberty. Why should we assume that electoral control
of the President protects liberty, but electoral control of the Legislature does not?
Then-Judge Kavanaugh drew a similar, puzzling link between liberty and
democracy in his dissent in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,43 where he had concluded that the CFPB’s structure was
unconstitutional, anticipating the result in Seila Law.44 He began his dissent in
37. 140 S. Ct. at 2197; see also Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1787 (holding that removal restrictions on director of
the Federal Housing Finance Agency were unconstitutional). Id. at 1786 (“The President’s removal power serves
important purposes regardless of whether the agency in question affects ordinary Americans by directly
regulating them or by taking actions that have a profound but indirect effect on their lives.”).
38. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2200.
43. 881 F.3d 75.
44. Id. at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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striking terms: “This case is about executive power and individual liberty.”45
Kavanaugh argued that the single-director structure was unconstitutional
because a sole, independent agency head was restrained neither by the
democratically accountable president nor by other members of a commission,
such as the Federal Trade Commission or Securities and Exchange Commission.
Unlike the CFPB, such “multiple-member independent agencies do not
concentrate all power in one unaccountable individual, but instead divide and
disperse power across multiple commissioners and board members,” which
“reduces the risk of arbitrary decision-making and abuse of power, and helps
protect individual liberty.”46 Kavanaugh’s understanding of liberty here seemed
to be freedom from administrative interference in private rights. He argued that
the CFPB’s structure would fail to provide as strong a “check on the excesses of
any individual agency head” as either at-will removal by the President or a
commission structure.47
The majority opinion authored by Judge Pillard took issue with this
conception of liberty:
It remains unexplained why we would assess the challenged removal
restriction with reference to the liberty of financial service providers, and not
more broadly to the liberty of the individuals and families who are their
customers . . . . Congress understood that markets’ contribution to human
liberty derives from freedom of contract, and that such freedom depends on
market participants’ access to accurate information, and on clear and reliably
enforced rules against fraud and coercion.48

Pillard went into greater detail here than either Kavanaugh or Roberts in
explaining what kind of liberty she thought was at issue, namely, a freedom to
contract in circumstances that make reasoned decision-making possible. She did
so, however, in the course of denying that a “freestanding liberty” value was
legally relevant at all, as opposed to merely a background interest that
separation-of-powers doctrine promotes.49 Roberts’ declined this invitation to
judicial modesty in Seila Law with his insistence on the centrality of liberty to
resolving structural constitutional questions.
B. DELEGATION
Liberty and democracy have also arisen in the context of the nondelegation
doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine requires that, when Congress delegates the
power to make rules with the force of law, it must provide an “intelligible
principle” to cabin its discretion.50 This doctrine has long been moribund, only

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 105.
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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in vigor at the height of conservative reaction to the New Deal.51 But it is now
poised to make a comeback. In the cases in which it has arisen, Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch have invoked underspecified understandings of liberty and
democracy to justify the doctrine’s revival.
In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads
(Amtrak),52 the Court addressed whether Amtrak was a public or private entity
for the purpose of resolving constitutional challenges to its standard-setting
authority. One of these challenges asserted that, if Amtrak were private, such
authority would constitute an improper delegation of legislative power. In his
concurrence arguing for a major strengthening of nondelegation standards,
Thomas emphasized the liberty interest at issue in legislative control of the
Executive, paraphrasing John Locke’s view: “If a person could be deprived
of . . . private rights on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted by the
legislature, he was not truly free.”53 Thomas followed Locke in understanding
liberty to mean having “‘a standing rule to live by,’ and to be free from ‘the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.’”54 Thomas was
not explicit here about why liberty required that rules be promulgated by the
Legislature, rather than by the courts or the Executive or private bodies. So long
as rules are made, who cares who makes them?
Thomas’s view, it seems, was that lax nondelegation standards allowed
legislative power to wander from the institution where the people had initially
placed it, thus undermining their consent to government.55 This argument
emphasized the need to honor the formal constitutional compact the people had
freely entered into. But Thomas closed his concurrence by underscoring a
different kind of connection amongst liberty, democracy, and constitutional
structure:
We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that
concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the
hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no
comfortable home in our constitutional structure. The end result may be that
trains run on time (although I doubt it), but the cost is to our Constitution and
the individual liberty it protects.56

This reference to “accountability” gestured at some more functional rather than
formal advantage of the legislature over executive agencies in remaining
controlled by the people. The problem posed by legislative delegation was not

51. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 448 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good
year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”).
52. 575 U.S. 43 (2015).
53. Id. at 76 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 75–76 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 13 (J. Gough ed., 1947)).
55. Id. at 73–77.
56. Id. at 91.
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merely that it violated the people’s choice to vest such power in one body rather
than another. More than this, delegation from elected to unelected officials
would undermine the government’s accountability to the citizenry.
The formal underpinnings of the nondelegation revival again took center
stage in Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy.57 The case concerned a criminal statute that
permitted the Attorney General to “specify the applicability” of provisions
requiring registration of sex offenders to persons convicted prior to the statute’s
enactment.58 Writing for a plurality, Justice Kagan read the statute narrowly so
as to keep the Attorney General’s discretion to a minimum and avoid a
nondelegation problem. Gorsuch’s dissent argued that the nondelegation
doctrine should be given sharper teeth, preventing the executive from making
“policy decisions when regulating private conduct.”59 He grounded the
nondelegation doctrine in the separation of powers, and explained that the latter
principle is “about respecting the people’s sovereign choice to vest the
legislative power in Congress alone. And it’s about safeguarding a structure
designed to protect their liberties, minority rights, fair notice, and the rule of
law.”60 Here, as in the Amtrak case, democracy figured as the people’s
foundational “choice” to vest the legislative power in Congress. The liberty
interests implicated are those of private persons threatened with criminal
penalties or other sanctions.
Later in the opinion, however, democracy appeared to advance liberty in a
different way. Gorsuch worried that the Court’s failure to apply the
nondelegation doctrine to strike down the statute “would only serve to accelerate
the flight of power from the legislative to the executive branch, turning the latter
into a vortex of authority that was constitutionally reserved for the people’s
representatives in order to protect their liberties.”61 Gorsuch here recognized not
only the people’s constitutional design choice to vest legislative power in a
particular institution but also that the purpose of this design was to protect the
people’s “liberties.” The argument seemed to be that if the “people’s
representatives” must make all the relevant policy choices, then the people can
control what those choices are, and thus protect whatever liberty interests the
people think are sufficiently important.
C. DEFERENCE
The Court’s jurisprudence on judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of law also raises concerns about liberty and democracy.
Consider the landmark case, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

139 S. Ct. at 2116.
Id. at 2122.
Id. at. 2136, 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2135.
Id. at 2142.
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Council, Inc.62 There, the Court rested judicial deference to agencies in part on
a theory of legislative intent—that when Congress delegates implementing
authority to an administrative agency, it “implicitly” also delegates the agency
the authority to “fill” any interpretive “gaps” in the statute.63 Courts must defer
to the agency because Congress intends for the Executive rather than the
Judiciary to resolve statutory ambiguities. Why should the courts honor
Congress’s choice? The answer might be formal—that Congress holds
legislative power and the courts interpret law. But that formal answer also rests
on the deeper democratic ground that the people made a choice to vest legislative
power with Congress.64 Honoring the intent of Congress on a particular matter
then honors the people’s intent with regard to constitutional structure.
The other democratic foundation for Chevron concerns the President.
Courts must defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations because “the Chief
Executive” is “directly accountable to the people.”65 This is the same story we
heard from Roberts in Seila Law. As the only official with a national
constituency, the presidency is well-positioned to “make policy choices” in a
way that is responsive to and checked by the people’s interests and values.66
Liberty does not explicitly arise in the reasoning of Chevron itself. But
Chevron is no doubt a government-favoring doctrine, tipping the scales in favor
of the Executive Branch’s interpretation of law against contrary interpretations
offered by courts or private parties.67 To that extent, it implicates concerns about
individuals’ independence from government coercion. Gorsuch raised this
concern in his critique of Chevron in his opinion for the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.68 The case involved some of the more
peculiar and arguably unsettling consequences of the Chevron case law, which
enables Executive Branch interpretations of statutory ambiguities to supersede
contrary judicial interpretations.69 The petitioner had applied for an immigration
status adjustment which would have been allowed under the Circuit’s
interpretation of the relevant statutory provision but was denied under the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) interpretation at the time of petitioner’s
application. Writing for the court, Gorsuch held that a presumption against
retroactivity applied, making the Circuit’s prior interpretation binding in the
petitioner’s case. Even though the BIA had already issued its restrictive
interpretation at the time of petitioner’s application for status adjustment, the
62. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
63. Id. at 843 (quoting in part Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“[T]he people . . . . organizes the government,
and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers.”).
65. 467 U.S. at 865.
66. Id.
67. Kent Barnet & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017)
(reporting that “the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of [agency] interpretations and applied Chevron deference
77% of the time”).
68. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
69. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 969 (2005).
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Circuit had not yet reviewed the BIA’s interpretation, so the BIA could not yet
enforce the new interpretation against the petitioner.
Gorsuch explained that “due process and equal protection concerns”
animated this holding, in a way that implicated both liberty and democracy.70
But here, unlike in the removal and delegation case law, democracy appears as
a threat to liberty, rather than as its protector: “retroactive application of new
penalties to past conduct that affected persons cannot now change denies them
fair notice of the law and risks endowing a decisionmaker expressly influenced
by majoritarian politics with the power to single out disfavored individuals for
mistreatment.”71 Here, Gorsuch underscored the conflict between the
petitioner’s liberty and the politically-accountable interpretations of the BIA,
which sits under the Attorney General within the Executive Branch.
In a concurrence separate from his opinion for the court, Gorsuch went
after Chevron deference directly. He argued that Chevron flew in the face of the
Framers scheme of a “government of separated powers,” in which “the avowedly
political legislature” made the law, an executive who was “also responsive to
the people” implemented it, and judges “insulated from political pressures”
interpreted it.72 Legislation would represent “the collective wisdom of the
people’s representatives,” whereas judicial independence would “guard against
governmental encroachment of the people’s liberties.”73 As elaborated in
subsequent case law, Chevron undermined this scheme by enabling the
democratically accountable executive to interpret law, and then permitting these
interpretations to trump certain prior judicial interpretations. He worried that
under this line of precedent, “the people aren’t just charged with awareness of
and the duty to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a
detached magistrate can muster,” but instead to “guess” about how ambiguous
terms will be interpreted by agencies and courts.74
Gorsuch took up this theme again when he rose to the Supreme Court in
his concurrence in Kisor v. Wilkie.75 That case considered the question of
whether, and to what degree, courts should defer to administrative agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations rather than the statutes they administer.
The Court upheld but cabined the existing Auer deference standard that these
interpretations are “controlling” unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.”76 Elaborating on recent precedent that had already trimmed Auer
back,77 Kagan’s plurality opinion explained that the judiciary should only defer
70. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1146.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1152.
75. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2400.
76. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
77. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 152–56 (2012); Blake Emerson,
The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2189–95
(2019) (describing and generally endorsing this line of cases).
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under Auer if the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous,” if the interpretation is
“reasonable,” if it represents the agency’s “authoritative” position and “fair and
considered judgment,” and falls within the agency’s “substantive expertise.”78
This was a fairly pragmatic opinion that constrained existing deference doctrine
without overruling a longstanding precedent.
Gorsuch’s concurrence drew on the due process and equal protection
themes he had underscored in Gutierrez-Brizuela to criticize the Auer doctrine:
[W]hen political actors are left free not only to adopt and enforce written laws,
but also to control the interpretation of those laws, the legal rights of litigants
with unpopular or minority causes or . . . who belong to despised or suspect
classes count for little . . . . They are left always a little unsure what the law
is, at the mercy of political actors and the shifting winds of popular opinion,
and without the chance for a fair hearing before a neutral judge.79

Precisely the same objection Gorsuch raised to Chevron applied to Auer:
judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations, like deference to
agency statutory interpretation, expanded democratic political power in a way
that could thwart individual agency and risked minority oppression. It
undermined the principle of judicial independence, which was meant to “guard
the people from the arbitrary use of power.”80 The liberties of the people as
individuals stood in contrast to the collective political power of the people as a
group.
D. SOME CONFLICTS
These cases show liberty and democracy continuously arising in the
conservative Justices’ contemporary critique of the administrative state. But
when we place these opinions alongside each other, it becomes less clear what
precise understanding of these values the Justices have in mind.
In Seila Law and PHH Corp., the President’s democratic accountability
protects the people’s liberty by ensuring administrative agencies do not unduly
coerce private parties. In his dissent in Gundy, by contrast, Gorsuch worried that
legislative delegation to the Executive would undermine the authority of the
“people’s representatives” in the Legislature.81 The logic of Seila Law and
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent are in tension. Seila Law’s strengthening of
presidential power is justified in part by the claim that the Executive is
democratic. But Roberts’ opinion does not acknowledge the competing
democratic claims of the elected Legislature to structure and constrain the
Executive Branch. Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy, meanwhile, emphasizes the
democratic legitimacy of the Legislature as a basis for strengthening the
nondelegation doctrine, while ignoring the compensating democratic claims of
78.
79.
80.
81.

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18.
Id. at 2437–38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 2438.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142.
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the Executive Branch, to which power would be delegated. Gorsuch in Gundy
emphasizes the democratic credentials of Congress alone, while Roberts’
opinion in Seila Law emphasizes the democratic credentials of the Executive
alone. The competing democratic claims of the one institution against the other
are not addressed in either opinion.
Another tension between the cases is the relationship between liberty and
democracy. Morrison, Seila Law, Thomas’s Amtrak concurrence, and Gorsuch’s
Gundy dissent all treat democracy as a means to protect liberty. Morrison and
Seila Law do so to justify expanding the power of the presidency, whereas
Thomas’ Amtrak concurrence and Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent do so to tighten
requirements for legislative delegation. The critique of judicial deference by
Gorsuch in Gutierrez-Brizuela and Kisor, by contrast, treats democracy as a
threat to liberty. It remains unexplained how the courts are to distinguish cases
where democracy threatens liberty from those where democracy preserves it.
Democracy is thus a matter of legislation in one context and of execution
in another. The executive is presented as defending liberty in some cases and as
threatening it in others. Are the Justices simply contradicting themselves? It is
not quite that simple. The next Part will show that these incongruities and
tensions can be explained to an extent by the complexity of the values of liberty
and democracy, each of which have different aspects or dimensions. The
problem is that, because the Justices do not articulate these distinctions, their
analyses conceal dubious and sometimes mistaken inferences about the effect of
institutional designs and judicial doctrines on each of these values. Further,
because the Justices do not acknowledge the complexity of liberty and
democracy, they overestimate the judiciary’s competency to reach a determinate
resolution about how best to promote them.
Given these values’ importance within our constitutional culture, it is
troubling that the Justices do not exercise greater care when they rely on them.
Before the Court relies on political theory to justify significant alterations in
legal doctrine and existing structures of government, it should ensure that it is
crystal clear on the terms of theory it would rely upon. The next Part aims to
provide the needed clarity by disentangling three aspects of liberty and
democracy that are at work in the conservative Justices’ jurisprudence. This
reconstruction foregrounds a more detailed critique of the Justices’ reasoning
and proposals for a narrower, better justified, and more constructive role that
these values might play in the reform of the administrative state.
II. THREE FACES OF LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY
This Part distinguishes various aspects of the values of liberty and
democracy that the conservative Justices’ public law jurisprudence deploys. In
order to make sense of the different ways in which the Justices use these
concepts, the Article looks to relevant resources in political thought and
American legal development. At the most general level, this analysis shows that
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when we think carefully about liberty and democracy in public law, we confront
an intricate pattern of values rather than a simple pairing. Courts and scholars
should thus tread with caution when drawing concrete legal inferences from
these general values. This Part will indicate some deficits in the way the
conservative Justices think about the different dimensions of these two values.
This analysis paves the way for a more granular critique of the Court’s reasoning
in the next Part.
It deserves emphasis that this Article does not argue that these
understandings of democracy and liberty are necessarily philosophically correct
or exhaustive of all relevant understandings of these values. The project here is
to provide an internal critique of the conservatives Justices’ jurisprudence,
which reveals their reliance on a political theory that is part and parcel of
American constitutional culture. This theoretical groundwork provides the basis
for criticizing the Justices’ reasoning in concrete cases. In addition, it lays the
foundations for an affirmative defense of the administrative state that the
conservative Justices ought to accept on the terms they themselves have adopted.
This approach leaves out of consideration other plausible understandings
of liberty and democracy, simply because the conservative Justices do not
acknowledge them.82 Likewise, there are other important values within public
law that do not enter into the value calculus in these cases, such as equality,
social welfare, and governmental “care” for people’s material interests and
moral values.83 While one might rightfully criticize the jurisprudence for those
omissions, consideration of these other values is beyond the scope of this Article.
A. THREE ASPECTS OF LIBERTY
The three aspects of liberty the Court invokes are discretionary liberty,
rational liberty, and political liberty. This typology does not perfectly map onto
other available distinctions within the political theory literature, such as liberty
that is “ancient” or “modern,”84 “negative” or “positive,”85 “liberal” or
“republican.”86 This Subpart rather aims to capture the aspects of liberty as used
in the conservative Justices anti-administrative jurisprudence. Because these
dimensions of liberty are grounded in long-running traditions of political
82. In particular, the American Progressives’ positive conception of freedom—understood as the
realization of individual capacities through public deliberation and material provision—is altogether ignored,
despite its centrality to the modern administrative state. For a discussion of the Progressives conception of
freedom and its intellectual origins, see EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW, supra note 14, at 32, 61–111. In addition,
the conservatives do not consider a deliberative understanding of democracy, though their concept of political
liberty captures some aspects of it. For an account of the administrative state’s deliberative-democratic
legitimacy, see id. at 168–76 and MASHAW, supra note 20, at 163–79.
83. See generally Blake Emerson, Public Care in Public Law: Structure, Procedure, and Purpose,
16 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2022).
84. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 309 (Biancamaria Fontanta trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1819).
85. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 169 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
86. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 17–31 (1997).
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thought, I rely on political theory in order to clarify various aspects of freedom
these jurists seem already to have in mind.
1. Discretionary Liberty: “Every Nook and Cranny of Daily Life”
The first sense of liberty the conservative Justices invoke is an individual’s
freedom to do as she wishes without legal command or coercion. This liberty is
discretionary in the sense that the individual may choose to act or not to act as
she will within a certain range without any obligation to justify her choice or
conform it to some standard. This was the kind of liberty Roberts seems to have
thought was at risk in Seila Law when he referred to the fact that the CFPB
Director had “authority to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on
millions of private citizens and businesses.”87 He expressed a similar worry in
City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission88 about “hundreds of
federal agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life.”89 These nooks
and crannies are where discretionary liberty has its home. We will see that the
Court often seems to implicitly prioritize this kind of liberty over others.
Opinions in administrative law concerned with discretionary liberty worry
about “agency overreaching,”90 where what is reached over and into is a sphere
of individual independence apart from the political community as a whole. The
area of discretionary liberty is generally marked out by the “private rights” of
the individual,91 in particular their property.92 Scalia captured this understanding
vividly in his dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon,93 in which a group of “small landowners” and others
unsuccessfully challenged administrative agencies’ interpretation of the
Endangered Species Act as prohibiting certain conduct that harmed protected
species’ habitats.94 Scalia argued that “[t]he Court’s holding . . . imposes
unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the
simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.”95 The
“unfairness” at issue is the government’s interference with private property that
should instead be left to its owners’ disposition.
This way of thinking about liberty lies at the very foundation of liberal
political thought. Consider, for instance, Thomas Hobbes’ definition of the
“Liberty of Subjects.”96 Beyond certain natural rights of self-preservation,
Hobbes understood liberty under government to consist in “the Silence of the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
569 U.S. 290.
Id. at 315 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1963 (2015).
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
Id. at 692.
Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME & POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH
ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 127 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2010) (1651).
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Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath
Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion.”97 Legal coercion
thus enforces the boundaries of civil liberty.98 John Locke concurred with
Hobbes in defining civil liberty as “a liberty to follow my own Will in all things,
where the Rule prescribes not.”99 He drew the circle of inviolate natural rights
more widely than Hobbes did, so as to include not only person but also property.
The political discourse of the Revolutionary Era embraced this liberal
understanding of freedom as a power to choose within the bounds of the law on
the basis of the security provided by rights over property and person.100
The exercise of discretionary liberty relies on a “frontier between the area
of private life and that of public authority.”101 Such a fixed legal border between
public and private had its jurisprudential heyday in the Lochner Era. The Court
sought to delineate “the boundary of the police power beyond which its exercise
becomes an invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,”102 particularly the liberty of contract. One might attempt
sympathetically to understand this jurisprudence as “safeguarding from state
intrusion a realm of freedom . . . whose center is located in the rounds of
everyday life.”103
Since the New Deal, constitutional law has retreated from this effort to
mark out a private economic sphere immune from government regulation.104 But
discretionary liberty has continued to influence conservative jurisprudence at the
level of administrative law. Such liberty was on Justice Rehnquist’s mind in
Heckler v. Chaney,105 where he held that an agency’s decision not to bring an
enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable.106 The case concerned a
petition submitted by prison inmates convicted of capital offenses to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement actions addressing the use
of certain drugs in death penalty protocols.107 In justifying the conclusion that
the FDA’s decision not to take action was not reviewable, Rehnquist argued that
97. Id. at 133.
98. Hobbes’ definition of the liberty of subjects is not to be confused with his understanding of natural
liberty as “the absence of externall Impediments.” Id. at 80. For an illuminating discussion of the difference
between natural liberty and the liberty of subjects, see Quentin Skinner, Thomas Hobbes on the Proper
Signification of Liberty, 40 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 121, 128–38 (1990).
99. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 302 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1960) (1690).
100. JOHN PHILIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 115 (1988).
101. Id. at 171.
102. Adkins v. Child. Hosp. of the D.C., 43 S. Ct. 394, 403 (1923) (Taft, J., dissenting), overruled in part
by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
103. Robert Post, Defending the Lifeworld, Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 1489, 1518 (1998).
104. But see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); Amanda
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016); Jeremy Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment
Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016).
105. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
106. Id. at 837–38.
107. Id. at 824.
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“when an agency refuses to act, it generally does not exercise its coercive power
over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.”108 Decisions like this focus
judicial review on the protection of regulated parties who are threatened by
agency action rather than of regulatory beneficiaries who want to enjoy the
protection of agency action. We now hear the increasingly loud echo of the
Lochner jurisprudence in the Roberts’ Court’s emphasis on protecting “liberty”
against the “coercive power of the state.”109
While intuitively clear, the concept of discretionary liberty becomes much
murkier once we acknowledge how frequently and pervasively legal coercion
constrains what individuals may do. As Robert Hale famously observed, where
property law carves out a right of one person to exclude the rest of the world
from the use of certain resources, such an entitlement enables the right-bearer to
work their will on others who need the resources she holds.110 Discretion for me
may be a bond for thee. And depending on how rights are allocated, some people
may end up with materially wider zones of discretionary choice than others.
Figures like Scalia’s “simplest farmer” may find their options severely limited
by larger private enterprises which, as a function of legal rules, may exclude the
small farmer’s products from the market.111 This means that an exercise of legal
coercion by the government may increase the discretionary liberty of some
parties even as it constricts the liberty of others. Conversely, as Justice Thurgood
Marshall observed in his concurrence in Heckler, “governmental refusal to act
could have just as devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness as coercive governmental action.”112 This observation was
particularly apt in this case, which concerned the lawfulness of death penalty
protocols.113 The FDA’s decision not to act on death-sentenced prisoners’
petition may have reduced the prisoners’ time to live, and thus whatever
discretionary liberty they would have enjoyed under confinement during that
period. The prevalence of legal coercion, throughout the system of public and
private law, make it difficult to draw any general conclusions about whether
government action or inaction will expand or constrict the sphere of choice
enjoyed by individuals.
One who values discretionary liberty nonetheless stresses the ultimate or
instrumental value in leaving some matters up to the dispersed if unequal control
108. Id. at 832.
109. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
110. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470,
471–72 (1923). On Hale’s significance for legal thought, see generally BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
111. Richard Sexton, Market Power, Misconceptions, and Modern Agricultural Markets, 95 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 209, 211 (2013) (“Close vertical coordination between farming and downstream marketing stages has
long been controversial because of its potential implications for the economic freedom of farmers, the exercise
of buyer market power, and the survival of small-scale traditional farm.”).
112. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 824.
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of various individuals. This kind of discretion enables a supposedly
“spontaneous order[]” to emerge from isolated individual choices without
conscious social planning.114 Once a scheme of suitably broad private rights has
been established, the government ought generally to “withhold[] its legislative
hand” and maintain what liberty it can by its silence.115 The primary threat the
administrative state poses, on this view of liberty, is an “excess of law-making”
that micromanages the choices that individuals should be able to make on their
own.116 Because, however, there is very little clarity about how much legal
coercion is “too much,” invocation of discretionary liberty usually operates as
an all-purpose break on the power of government, without any clear limiting
principle. Moreover, because discretionary liberty may be thwarted by the
exercise of private as well as public legal rights, one-sided concern for the
overweening coercive power of the state, without attention to the coercive power
of private actors, arbitrarily tips the scales against governmental action.
2. Rational Liberty: “The Rug Will Not be Pulled from Under Them”
Liberty as discretion must be distinguished from another, rational sort of
liberty that is at play in the conservative Justices’ jurisprudence. This is a pivotal
conception of liberty that has not received adequate attention within
contemporary public law scholarship. It provides a firm basis on which to
conceptualize, assess, and legitimize the administrative state.
Whereas discretionary liberty is measured by the range of options law
leaves open to individual choice, rational liberty is measured by the facilities law
provides for individuals to understand and pursue the options that are available.
Thomas referred to this kind of liberty when he relied on John Locke to insist on
the importance of being “free from ‘the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,
arbitrary will of another man.’”117 Rational liberty emphasizes that it is not
merely coercion but the unpredictability of such coercion that interferes with
freedom. Such liberty was at stake when Gorsuch argued in Kisor that Auer
deference would leave people “always a little unsure what the law is,” and that
instead independent judicial determination of regulatory terms was necessary to
“guard the people against the arbitrary use of governmental power.”118
Arbitrariness here figures as randomness, as force dissociated from a governing
rule. Gorsuch raised similar concerns in Gutierrez-Brizuela with regard to
Chevron deference, noting that “the people . . . are . . . required to guess” about

114. F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 39–52 (1973).
115. Hale, supra note 110, at 470 (quoting W.S. Gilbert, Iolanthe).
116. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James
Madison)). For a comprehensive critique of this kind of thinking, see Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much
Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 (2012).
117. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. at 75–76 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 13 (J. Gough ed., 1947)).
118. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2438 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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how agencies and courts will interpret the statute, and must “remain alert to the
possibility that the agency will reverse its current view.”119 Abandoning
Chevron, Gorsuch argues, would instead “promote reliance interests by allowing
citizens to organize their affairs with some assurance that the rug will not be
pulled from under them tomorrow, the next day, or after the next election.”120
To be “free” in these contexts means to be subject to and benefit from
certain, coherent, stable rules, which are known in advance. This is the lawyer’s
favorite kind of freedom because its exercise often depends on reasoned advice,
careful planning, and credible commitments. Rational liberty is different from
the discretionary liberty of the isolated hermit. It is rather the freedom of the
driver in traffic who can get to her destination because the law tells her and
everyone else which side of the street to drive on and what color on the traffic
signal means “go.” Freedom of this kind treats law not primarily, in the
Hobbesian sense, as “Chains,”121 but more, with H.L.R. Hart, as “powerconferring.”122 The law facilitates and channels purposive conduct so that people
can achieve their objectives efficiently with little friction against, and often in
cooperation with, others.
Rational liberty has its most famous jurisprudential exponent in Lon Fuller
and his “morality of law.”123 The morality of law consists of several attributes
that make law genuinely obligatory. This morality provides that rules should:
exist; be made public; be imposed only prospectively; be made comprehensible,
consistent, and stable over time; be capable of compliance; and be followed by
the officials who implement them.124 Fuller thought these basic procedural
principles presumed a particular moral conception: “To embark on the enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a
commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable
of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.”125 The
morality of law was therefore at bottom a matter of respecting an individuals’
rational liberty, or what Fuller called their “powers of self-determination.”126
Fuller thus emphasized the “urgent demand of rationality” in adjudicatory
proceedings, in order to shape legal materials into a coherent and understandable
set of terms by which reasonable people could lead their lives.127
The morality of law is alive and well in administrative law, as Cass
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have recently argued.128 They show that many of
119. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152.
120. Id. at 1158.
121. HOBBES, supra note 96, at 128.
122. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 32–33 (3d ed., 2012).
123. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
124. Id. at 39.
125. Id. at 162.
126. Id.
127. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370 (1978).
128. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN, supra note 12, at 38–115. While Sunstein and
Vermeule rely heavily on Fuller’s specific criteria, they do not identify what, exactly, is “moral” about
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Fuller’s principles have been recognized in legal doctrine, despite having no
explicit source in positive law. For instance, it is well established that an agency
must follow its own regulations.129 Likewise, because “retroactivity is not
favored in the law,” an agency generally may only issue rules that are binding
on past conduct if the governing statute expressly grants that authority.130
Current administrative law does not in fact embrace all of Fuller’s
principles, however. Contrary to Vermeule and Sunstein’s suggestion, there is
currently no general principle condemning agencies if they “fail to make rules
in the first place” or if they decide issues “on a case to case” basis.131 The choice
between rulemaking and adjudication is generally up to the agency.132 And the
Court has explicitly rejected the attempt to implement the nondelegation
doctrine by requiring agencies to reduce the range of discretion delegated to
them by statute.133
Gorsuch’s and Thomas’s reasoning on judicial deference and
nondelegation would rely on Fullerian principles to radically reduce or even
eliminate agencies’ authority to make policy. They see administrative discretion
as a danger to individuals’ ability to carry out plans in reliance on stable rules.
This line of reasoning turns not on originalist interpretations of constitutional
text but on a moral reading of the virtues of the rule of law. As I shall argue in
Part IV, however, a genuine concern for rational liberty would result in a much
more tailored and constructive critique of the way in which administrative
agencies make and enforce policy.
3. Political Liberty: “To Enable the People to Govern Themselves”
The final aspect of liberty public law jurisprudence invokes is political
liberty. Political liberty is measured by the opportunities the law affords
individuals to influence and challenge the rules by which they are bound.
Perhaps the strongest statement of political liberty amongst the conservative
justices was offered, outside of the sphere of administrative law, by Justice
administrative law. They gesture at general concerns about maintaining “a shared constitutional enterprise”
ensuring legal “efficacy,” giving people “room to maneuver” without fear of coercion, and “maintaining
accountability, liberty, and welfare.” Id. at 7, 39, 63, 88. These sundry benefits are less specified than and largely
different from Fuller’s own express concern with preserving individual self-determination. The vagueness of
Sustein’s and Vermeule’s understanding of law’s morality may be an artifact of their desire to provide a broadly
acceptable set of considerations upon which the two of them, as well as critics and defenders of the administrative
state more broadly, could agree. As laudable as that enterprise may be, their approach does not provide enough
moral substance or value-differentiation to guide reasoned elaboration of the content and the domain of law’s
morality. The typology I provide here—grounded in contemporary jurisprudence and the tradition of American
political thought—provides necessary content to inform judicial decision-making and scholarly analysis.
129. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–66 (1954); see Allentown Mack Sales
& Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998).
130. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
131. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN, supra note 12, at 40.
132. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
133. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
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Scalia in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges,134 which recognized same-sex
couples’ constitutional right to marry. Criticizing what he understood to be the
majority’s judicial overreach, Scalia stated that “[t]his practice of constitutional
revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today)
by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important
liberty . . . : the freedom to govern themselves.”135
Such pleas for judicial restraint are a rarity in administrative law cases at
the Court today.136 The Court nonetheless continues to pay lip service to the
value of such political liberty when the Justices criticize the discretion vested in
federal agencies. Thomas, in his concurrence in Seila Law, described the
independent-commission structure as “a direct threat to our constitutional
structure and, as a result, the liberty of the American people.”137 Liberty here is
tied to the political powers the people exercise through governmental
institutions. As Roberts observed in Free Enterprise Fund, “[o]ur Constitution
was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected
leaders.”138 Gorsuch also gestures at this understanding in Kisor when he
referred to “disputes involving the relationship between the government and the
people” and to “‘policy’ judgment by the people and their representatives.”139
He might have referred here instead to “individuals” or “private parties,” but
invocation of “the people” suggests that a broader kind of liberty is at stake.
Political liberty is about citizens exercising control over the scheme of
social cooperation. Such liberty is not identical with the forms of democracy to
be described in the next Subpart. To be sure, it includes those electoral rights
that give the Legislature and Executive their claim to democratic legitimacy.
More than elections, however, political liberty also requires regular popular
involvement in and contestation over the exercise of power. Breyer has
described this as “active liberty,”140 which means “not only freedom from
government coercion but also the freedom to participate in the government
itself.”141
Such political liberty has ancient origins in republican political thought.142
Livy described the Roman Republic as a “free nation,” insofar as it was
134. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
135. Id. at 2627.
136. For an interesting exception that proves the rule, see the discussion in Justice Thomas’ opinion for the
Court in Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2385, discussed in Part IV.B, infra. Scalia himself once advocated
judicial restraint in administrative law cases. Auer, 519 U.S. at 457–58; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75; City of
Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296. But his views appeared to shift by end of his life and tenure. See Perez, 575 U.S. at
109 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137. 140 S. Ct. at 2211 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138. 561 U.S. at 499.
139. 139 S. Ct. at 2425, 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
140. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 16 (2005).
141. Id. at 3.
142. ANNELIEN DE DIJN, FREEDOM: AN UNRULY HISTORY 1–2 (2020) (Western political thought and
practice has long “identified freedom not with being left alone by the state but with exercising control over the
way one is governed”).
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“governed by annually elected officers of state and subject not to the caprice of
individual men, but to the overriding authority of law.”143 Liberty, through this
lens, was a civic capacity of self-rule through political action, including through
participation in lawmaking and adjudication. Whereas discretionary freedom
leaves individuals to make choices within the bounds of rules, and rational
liberty provides them with rules through which to carry those choices out,
political liberty enables them to participate somehow in creating and
implementing the rules within which they may act. Without political liberty, the
individual is merely left to the benevolence of unaccountable rulers as to whether
they will leave space for individual choice or keep a system of stable rules in
place.
This understanding of freedom as self-government was particularly
prominent in the political thought that informed the Revolution and Founding.144
In Cato’s Letters, Trenchard and Gordon emphasized the importance of “publick
liberty,” which required as well as “freedom of speech” and the right to have
magistrates’ “deeds openly examined and publickly scanned.”145 Political
freedom could not be maintained through a single moment of popular founding,
or by showing up regularly at the polls, but rather required ongoing watchfulness
over the officers of government. James Madison accordingly saw that “the
genius of republican liberty, seems to demand . . . not only that all power should
be derived from the people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept in
independence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments.”146 This
kind of liberty was not, like discretionary liberty, strictly opposed to political
power but rather consisted in citizens’ exercise of such power to control and
challenge governmental acts.147
Political liberty has changed its shape as the state has developed
administrative institutions. Bureaucratic systems generally require continuity of
personnel and a substantial degree of working independence from partisan
political pressures. Fidelity to principles of political liberty therefore requires
means of popular control and challenge other than rotation in office.148
Progressive thinkers sought to supply additional methods of popular
participation through administration.149 Woodrow Wilson argued that

143. LIVY, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 107, 2.2 (Aubrey de Sélincourt trans., 1960).
144. DE DIJN, supra note 142, at 184–96.
145. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS, OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND
RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 111 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995).
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 234 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 141–62 (2006) (1963).
148. See William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE 25, 46 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (drawing connections between the Framers’
republican concern to preserve political liberty against factional corruption and the regulatory reforms of the
Progressive Era, which “envisioned an active state apparatus as a continuous, countervailing force to the
organization of new forms of economic power in modern American life”).
149. EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW, supra note 14, at 61–112.
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administrative agencies should be exposed to “constant public counsel.”150 John
Dewey stressed that “the masses” must “have a chance to inform the experts as
to their needs,”151 just as Mary Follett argued for a “process of cooperation
between expert and people.”152 This participatory form of administration was
put in practice in agencies such as the Forest Service, which held extensive
deliberative public hearings on grazing rights on public lands, bringing to bear
“the compelling force of organized opinion to make a careless or arbitrary officer
respond to, and to bring a sympathetic officer into harmony with, the groups
affected.”153 The New Deal experimented with this model further in the
implementation of agricultural reforms, land-use planning, and other areas.154
The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process
imposed a thin form of this participatory model on all informal rulemaking
proceedings.155
This Progressive understanding of the administrative process as a forum of
political liberty gained renewed currency in the 1960s with that era’s focus on
civil rights, social reform, and direct democracy. As Charles Reich observed at
the time, “the planning process, theoretically the realm of the detached expert,
has been made political by the direct action of citizens.”156 Reich identified
administrative law cases that captured then-current judicial receptivity to this
political activism, including Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. Federal Communications Commission.157 In that case, the D.C. Circuit
held that various members of civil rights organizations had a right to intervene
in a television broadcaster’s license renewal proceeding before the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). These parties argued that the broadcaster
had discriminated against civil rights interests in violation of the fairness
doctrine. But the FCC denied them the right to intervene and then renewed the
license without holding a hearing. In setting aside the license renewal, thenJudge Burger emphasized that “individual citizens and the communities they
compose owe a duty to themselves and their peers to take an active interest in
the scope and quality of the television service which stations and networks
provide and which, undoubtedly, has a vast impact on their lives and the lives of

150. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 217 (1887).
151. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 208 (Ohio Univ. Press, 1954) (1927).
152. MARY FOLLETT, CREATIVE EXPERIENCE 218 (1924).
153. JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 200
(1927).
154. EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW, supra note 14, at 118–29; JESS GILBERT, PLANNING DEMOCRACY:
AGRARIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE INTENDED NEW DEAL (2015) (describing participatory land use planning
during New Deal); WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 116–44 (1941) (describing
“the infusion of lay elements into the administrative process,” including in labor, agriculture, and banking). But
see Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1217 (2020) (arguing that
the “democratic bona fides” of elected administrators in agricultural space are “questionable”).
155. 5 U.S.C. §553(c); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142 (3d ed., 1972).
156. Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1228 (1966).
157. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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their children.”158 That obligation of citizenship implied a corresponding right
to participate in the administrative process.159
Richard B. Stewart famously understood cases like this to represent an
“interest representation model” of the administrative process that reached its
high watermark when he wrote in the 1970s.160 Stewart worried, however, that
judicial imposition of these procedural requirements rendered the administrative
process too burdensome while failing to represent all affected interests fairly.161
The Supreme Court appeared persuaded by such concerns in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,162 where it
struck back against the D.C. Circuit’s ongoing procedural innovations, which it
believed “seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress.”163
There is indeed considerable tension between judicial elaboration or
embellishment of the administrative procedures Congress establishes and the
ideal of political liberty itself. Self-rule, after all, consists in the citizens’ control
over government, not in government by judges. But there is little doubt that the
ideal of self-government continues to animate aspects of the administrative
process that the courts superintend. Witness, for example, the 3.7 million
comments on the Obama Administration’s proposed net neutrality rule,164 or the
124,000 comments submitted in response to the Trump Administration’s
proposed changes to Title IX sex-discrimination enforcement policy.165 As a
function of the rulemaking process Congress and the courts have designed,
citizens continue to avail themselves of the opportunity, sometimes in great
numbers, to participate in administrative policymaking.
This is not to say that the administrative process is maximally respectful of
political liberty, nor that mass commenting is the most effective means to
achieve political influence. To the contrary, powerful regulated parties usually
dominate the process over ordinary citizens.166 Part IV will note some legislative
and administrative reforms that would address such problems. But these
examples of public involvement in rulemakings nonetheless show the potential
of the administrative process to advance political liberty. Administrative
procedures create fora, beyond elections, in which persons affected by executive
158. Id. at 1003.
159. Id. at 1005.
160. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1728–
29 (1975).
161. Id. at 1762–76.
162. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
163. Id. at 548.
164. Federal Communications Commission, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Final Rule, 80
Fed. Reg. 19,739, 19,746 (Apr. 13, 2015).
165. Department of Education, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,044 (May 19, 2020).
166. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group
Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 137 (2006); Cynthia R. Farina, Dmitry Epstein, Josiah Heidt
& Mary J. Newhart, Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rulemaking Participation,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2012).
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policymaking can influence and constrain it. The conservative Justices,
however, have altogether ignored this potential of the administrative process to
protect political liberty. Instead, as I show in Part III, they rely on tools of
structural constitutional law that are not well-suited to preserve it.
B. THREE ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY
This Section distinguishes three aspects of democracy at work in the
conservative Justices’ jurisprudence: constitutive democracy, legislative
democracy, and executive democracy. As we make our way through each of
these aspects of democracy, we will see that American law does not treat the
people as univocal. Rather, their authority is dispersed across time and across
institutions. This diffusion complicates inferences from democratic values to
democracy-promoting legal rules. It cautions against the conservative Justices’
confident conclusions that the Court can determine how best to institutionalize
democratic power.
1. Constitutive Democracy: “The People’s Sovereign Choice”
Contemporary public law sometimes invokes democracy in terms of
popular sovereignty. In this register, democracy refers to the constituent power
that brings government into being and defines its fundamental purposes,
authorities, and limitations. Consider, for example, Gorsuch’s argument in
Gundy that the nondelegation doctrine rests on “the people’s sovereign choice
to vest the legislative power in Congress alone.”167 The Constitution, in this
view, represents a democratic decision about how government ought to be
structured. This modern, popular theory of sovereignty replaced the single
monarchical sovereign with the body of the people.168 That democratic
understanding was taken up in the American Founding.169 As Publius remarked
in Federalist 49, “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is
from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived.”170
Whereas Revolutionary-Era republican theory saw the many and the few
as antagonistic social groups that needed to share power within a mixed form of
government,171 the Federalists’ constitutional theory treated each department of
167. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135.
168. Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12 CONSTELLATIONS
223, 238–39 (2005). This concept has origins in Roman law and gained its modern footing in the various forms
with Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes. See generally DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016).
169. RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 181–201
(2015). See, e.g., Philodemus, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party
Prejudice, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 606, 612 (Charles
Hyneman ed., 1983) (1784) (“In a true commonwealth or democratic government, all authority is derived from
the people at large, held only during their pleasure, and exercised only for their benefit.”).
170. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
171. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70–71 (rev. ed., 1992).
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government as representing the same unified, sovereign people in a different
way. Popular sovereignty could then underlie an institutionally “aristocratic”
form of government, with an independent, life-tenured judiciary and indirect
election of the President and senators.172 Sovereignty resided in the people as a
whole, while the government they erected could depart from majoritarian
principles, so long as the people retained the power to alter the basic shape of
government.173
Constitutive democracy, on its own, is a fairly abstract and episodic form
of democracy. Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison174 understood
the founding exercise of popular sovereignty to be “a very great exertion; nor
can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so
established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.”175
The Constitution does provide formal procedures for amendment under Article
V, but these are so onerous as to keep majoritarian, sovereign will from coming
into effect.176 If the people cannot effectively amend the Constitution, then their
ability to consent to it in the present is badly impaired.177 The popular sovereign
might then not only be “sleeping,” but in a “coma.”178
Originalist scholars nonetheless insist that the people’s choice at the
Founding remains binding in the present,179 while some admit that at least
certain constitutional questions might be resolved through democratic political
processes.180 Some living constitutionalists, on the other hand, understand the
Constitution to admit ongoing, democratic change, either through occasional
constitutional moments of heightened public deliberation,181 or through broader
processes of “popular constitutionalism” that operate through the political
branches and broader social contestation.182 The shared point of convergence

172. GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 562 (1969).
173. TUCK, supra note 169, 1–5, 209–12. The Founding was not actually inclusive of all “the people.”
Women, black people, Native Americans, and many persons without property were excluded. Jamal Greene,
Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 518 (2011). Theorists of constitutive democracy
nonetheless understand the ratification process as a pathbreaking exercise in self-government for property
owning white males. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5–11 (2005).
174. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
175. Id. at 176.
176. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article
V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (arguing that the Article V process is not exclusive); David E. Pozen &
Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2317, 2387–88 (2021)
(identifying routine departures from and uncertainties concerning Article V’s requirements).
177. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J. 664,
683–86 (2017).
178. Id. at 687.
179. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015).
180. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2019).
181. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 286 (1993).
182. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8
(2005); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy,
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amongst these theories is that the Constitution’s allocation of power, rights, and
duties among the branches of the federal government and the states represents a
decision of the people themselves.
Though scholars and jurists treat constitutive democracy as a fundamental
value, it rarely plays a decisive role in the cases this Article considers. Invocation
of the people’s sovereign power in administrative law merely ornaments the
formal claim that a given rule is constitutionally required with the appealing
suggestion that the rule is also democratically legitimate. Whether that claim
rings true depends on one’s assessment of the democratic credentials of the
Constitution and the accuracy of the Justices’ divination of the people’s
sovereign will.
The conservative Justices’ repeated emphasis on the democratic
foundations of the Constitution is nonetheless important for two reasons. First,
this way of justifying legal conclusions admits that democracy is ultimately prior
to and constitutive of law within our public legal system and culture. The
normative priority of the people over the law that binds them cuts against
exclusive judicial determination of what the constitutional ideals of liberty and
democracy entail. If constitutive democracy matters to the conservative Justices,
they should be reticent to dictate to the people and their elected officials which
aspects of liberty ought to be prioritized, or to second-guess the people’s
representatives’ allocation of power between the elected branches, without
crystal clear textual warrant. And yet, as we shall see in Part III, the Justices
frequently intrude on democratic decision-making in this fashion. They thus
undercut and usurp the people’s sovereign power to establish the content and
boundaries of both fundamental and ordinary law.
The Court’s recognition of the democratic foundations of the Constitution
are important for a second and related reason. The difficulty of exercising
constitutive democracy requires auxiliary organs of regular democratic politics
to give effect to the people’s voice in the present. If our concern is to understand
the democratic character of American law, we must then look beyond the
circumstances of the Constitution’s ratification and the super-majoritarian
process of amendment it prescribes. In the domain of federal public law,183 we
must turn first and foremost to the democratic resources of the elected
branches—the legislature and executive. According to the political theory the
conservative Justices rely on, it is these branches, rather than the judiciary, that
have the primary role of making policy judgments concerning how democratic
will should be exercised.

92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004). For a political theory of founding along these lines, see ANGÉLICA MARIA
BERNAL, BEYOND ORIGINS: RETHINKING FOUNDING IN A TIME OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2017).
183. On democracy in state constitutions, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy
Principle in State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859 (2021).
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2. Legislative Democracy: “The Branch . . . Most Responsive to Popular
Will”
Though popular sovereignty in the American political tradition represents
the most fundamental kind of democracy, it is also the most removed from
ordinary politics. If the people exercise their authority only in rare moments of
constitutional enactment or amendment, the connection between popular will
and government policy will be quite weak. Legislation by an assembly of elected
representatives creates a more routine, practical connection between the people
and government than does the foundational exercise of constituent power.
Such a democratic understanding of legislation arises in the Court’s
nondelegation jurisprudence, as a complement to the argument that the people’s
sovereign choice was to vest the legislative power with Congress. In an early
effort to strengthen delegation restrictions in his concurrence in Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene Case),184
Rehnquist argued that the purpose of the doctrine was to “ensure[] to the extent
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will.”185 Gorsuch struck the same note in his dissent in
Gundy: “The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected
representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”186
This popular understanding of the Legislature has not always been a source
of adulation. The legislatures of the Revolutionary Era were “very much of the
democratic kind,” as their elected representatives assumed primacy over the
judiciary and the executive, both of which remained associated with British
rule.187 But by 1787 the proponents of the new Constitution had grown wary of
the concentration of legislative power, particularly in the lower houses of the
state legislatures.188
Despite all this jealousy of the people’s power to make law, the Framers
could not deny its central place within a republican constitutional scheme.189 At
the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson “contended strenuously for
drawing the most numerous branch of the legislature immediately from the
people . . . . No government could long subsist without the confidence of the
people.”190 The government, in his view, “ought to possess . . . the mind or sense
of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of

184. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
185. Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
186. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131.
187. WOOD, supra note 172, at 163 (quoting Richard Henry Lee).
188. Id. at 474.
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[The Legislature’s]
constitutional powers [are] at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits” than the Executive’s);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“In republican government the
legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”).
190. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION at 49 (James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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the whole Society.”191 The republican ideal of the rule of law gave the
lawmaking body a central place within the constitutional order, such that it could
only be cabined rather than made subordinate to the others.192 And the
republican requirement that the people check the exercise of power meant that
this body had to be responsive to majoritarian interests.193
The Legislature’s popular foundations gave it claims against the
interference of the other departments. James Thayer, in his influential defense
of the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative acts,194 explained that
the courts must presume that legislators are persons “fit to represent a selfgoverning people, such as our theory of government assumes to be carrying on
our public affairs.”195 The Judiciary must give the Legislature wide discretion in
order to respect the unique mandate of popular governance that the Constitution
reposes in that body. Justice Holmes took a Thayerian approach in arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment ought not to be used, in the context of judicial review
of state legislation, “beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires.”196 There was no hard and fixed line between a “private” sphere that
legislation could not touch and another, “affected with a public interest,” where
it had play.197 Rather, “the Legislature may forbid or restrict any business when
it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it.”198 This understanding came
to predominate in understandings of the federal legislative power, too, with the
New Deal Court adopting a Thayerian rational basis approach to economic and
social legislation.199
Public law today does not treat the democratic claims of the Legislature as
absolute, however. Jurists and legal scholars readily identify countermajoritarian “values” and “matters of principle” requiring judicial protection,200
if only to save democracy from itself.201 Public choice theory at the same time
deflates idealistic assumptions about legislation, presuming instead that
legislators are motivated by self-interest and that statutes strike bargains between

191. Id. at 132.
192. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION at 74 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
193. See 1 RECORDS, at 49 (James Madison) (“Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch
of the national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government.”).
194. See Mathew J. Franck, James Bradley Thayer and the Presumption of Constitutionality: A Strange
Posthumous Career, 8 AM. POL. THOUGHT 393 (2019).
195. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 149 (1893).
196. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921).
197. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
198. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offs. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
199. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
200. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16–27 (2d ed., 1986).
201. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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powerful social groups rather than identify any genuinely public interest.202 But
just as the Framers, suspicious of Legislatures, nonetheless acknowledged their
central republican role, today’s scholars and jurists continue to pay tribute to
legislation’s democratic legitimacy. As Daniel Farber notes, the principle of
“legislative supremacy” in statutory interpretation is rooted in the “basic social
norm of democratic self-government,” requiring courts to implement the
legislature’s intent, at least where that intent can clearly be discerned.203 The
legislature is the people’s “most immediate agent”204 and so statutory law “is
meant to embody the people’s will.”205
Both textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation
generally rely on the democratic nature of the Legislature. Textualist
interpretation purports to reduce judicial discretion and provides clear rules by
which legislative majorities can write their will into the law.206 Consideration of
the underlying purpose of the law, on the other hand, is supposed to enable the
Court to carry out the popular will that legislation expresses.207 As Roberts put
it in King v. Burwell,208 “[i]n a democracy, the power to make the law rests with
those chosen by the people . . . . [I]n every case we must respect the role of the
Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.”209
One problem the nondelegation doctrine puts its finger on is that the
Legislature often legislates in such broad terms that it is not clear what,
precisely, the legislature has “done.” If the Legislature can avoid making
fundamental policy choices, so the argument goes, then the people’s electoral
control over legislators will not translate into control over policy. The
democratic irony of nondelegation, however, is that it remedies a purported
deficit in popular control by empowering unelected judges to invalidate statutes
duly enacted by the people’s representatives.210 Moreover, the democratic
argument against legislative delegation rarely engages in an analysis of
202. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 12–14 (1985)
(describing assumption of the self-interested legislator); Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 49, 72 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell
eds., 2010) (“[Legislators] heed interest groups’ demands because groups provide valuable political resources—
most fundamentally votes and money—to legislators who advance groups’ legislative preferences.”).
203. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 293 (1989).
204. John F. Manning, The Supreme Court 2013 Term—Forward: The Means of Constitutional Power,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).
205. BREYER, supra note 140, at 94.
206. United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(textualism “fosters . . . democratic process”); For critiques of Scalia’s view, see Cass R. Sunstein, Justice
Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 677 (1990).
207. BREYER, supra note 140, at 95 (“[a]n interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator’s
will help to implement the public’s will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”).
208. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
209. Burwell, 576 U.S., at 498. On Roberts’ opinion as borrowing from some aspects of purposivism, see
Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox
Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 64 (2015).
210. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 327.

February 2022

LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY

405

comparative democratic-institutional competence. When the legislature
delegates, it ordinarily delegates to the executive branch. And the executive
branch, too, has claims to democratic legitimacy. As we shall see in Part III, the
competing democratic claims of the Executive and the Legislature make it
difficult for the courts to draw confident conclusions about how statutory rules
concerning delegation and presidential removal powers are likely to effect
overall democratic control.
3. Executive Democracy: “The Most Democratic and Politically
Accountable Official”
In explaining why the President must have power to supervise and control
executive officers, Roberts claimed that “the Framers made the President the
most democratic and politically accountable official in government.”211 There is
no doubt that, today, we usually think of the President as a democratic figure.
But that view is not a product of the Framer’s original understanding. Rather, it
emerged from subsequent political developments. Executive democracy thus
operates within the conservative jurisprudence as a living reinterpretation of the
Constitution that favors greater presidential control of administration.
While Hamilton admitted it was “desirable, that the sense of the people
should operate in the choice” of the President, he thought it “equally desirable
that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analizing
the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favourable
to deliberation and to a judicious combination of all reasons and inducements,
which were proper to govern their choice.”212 The electoral college removed the
President from direct popular control and deprived him of a claim to popular
authority.213 James Wilson had spoken in favor of direct “election by the people”
at the Convention.214 But his proposal was ultimately rejected in the face of
objections such as Elbridge Gerry’s that “a popular election . . . [was] radically
vicious” due to the “ignorance of the people.”215
The democratic connotations of executive power are therefore not original,
as Roberts asserted, but rather historically emergent.216 Andrew Jackson
transformed the office by combining a strenuous defense of unitary executive
power with a democratic claim to represent the people as a whole.217 Jackson
understood the President to be “the direct representative of the American
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203.
THE FEDERALIST No. 68 at 457, 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
JAMES W. CAESAR, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 72 (1979).
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 190, at 68.
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 192, at 114; see JAMES KLOPPENBERG, TOWARD
DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-RULE IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 400–01 (2016).
216. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, JOHN A. DEARBORN & DESMOND KING, PHANTOMS OF A BELEAGUERED
REPUBLIC: THE DEEP STATE AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 36 (2020) (the unitary theory “joins an originalist
argument for an expansive reading of the vesting clause to [presidential] selection procedures that have been
radically altered in the course of time”).
217. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 23–28 (1954).

406

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

people.”218 His presidency instituted a system of party government, buoyed by
expansive white manhood suffrage, in which citizens participated not only by
voting but by occupying patronage posts in executive agencies such as the Post
Office.219 As Jackson’s Attorney General, Roger Taney gave legal
reinforcement to Jackson’s brand of popular politics with novel and expansive
understandings of presidential control of executive officers,220 laying early
precedents for the contemporary unitary executive theory.221
The Progressives built on but reformulated Jackson’s legacy to reconstruct
the presidency as a nationally representative office supervising a nascent
administrative state. The late-eighteenth century movement for civil service
reform sought to supplant the Jacksonian spoils system with a professional,
tenured corps of officers.222 The bureaucratic officialdom would provide the
machinery for a new constitutional order centered around the presidency rather
than Congress. Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency deployed the civil service to
begin to displace the Jacksonian spoils system and “replace party controls over
civil administration with independent executive controls.”223 In the 1912
election contest, both Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt sought to forge a direct
connection to the emerging mass public.224 As President, Wilson pioneered the
“rhetorical presidency,”225 using his speeches to build support for his major
legislative policy program, “The New Freedom.”226
The Progressives set the tone for a twentieth century in which democratic
authority came to be associated with the President’s electoral mandate and the
expansive bureaucratic power of the Executive.227 Franklin Roosevelt put this
vision to work in the New Deal, as administrative agencies combatted the Great
Depression.228 To get a grip on this burgeoning administrative apparatus, the

218. Id. at 23 (quoting JAMES D. RICHARDSON, 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1910 at 90 (1911)).
219. Martin Shefter, Party, Bureaucracy, and Political Change in the United States, in POLITICAL PARTIES:
DEVELOPMENT AND DECAY 211, 221–23 (Louis Maisel & Joseph Cooper eds., 1978).
220. The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497,
516 (1840).
221. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 101–04 (2008) (describing Taney’s views as largely consistent with the authors’
unitary theory of the executive branch).
222. BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 9–128 (2d ed., 2014).
223. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 at 179 (1982).
224. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8–21 (2009).
225. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 117–44 (1988).
226. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS
ENERGIES OF THE PEOPLE (1913).
227. Stephen Skowronek & Stephen M. Engel, Introduction, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL
REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 1, 6 (Stephen Skowronek,
Stephen M. Engel & Bruce Ackerman eds., 2016).
228. MILKIS, supra note 224, at 5.
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President’s Committee on Administrative Management aimed to strengthen
presidential responsibility and bureaucratic competence.229 The Committee
understood the president to be “an instrument for carrying out the judgment and
will of the people of a nation.”230 He was, on the one hand, a “political leader—
leader of a party, leader of the Congress, leader of a people,” and on the other, a
“Chief Executive and administrator within the Federal system and service.”231
Despite the growth of managerial capacity in the White House, the midcentury President did not achieve anything like complete and unqualified control
over the administrative state. Rather his political capacity depended upon a
complex set of considerations including formal powers, personal characteristics
and reputation, public standing, and the legal authorities and social
constituencies of the subordinate officials and coordinate branches he would aim
to “persuade.”232
The unitary executive theory that emerged in the Reagan years sought to
strengthen the President’s hand still further, but now at the expense of the
regulatory state that had animated the growth of the Executive Branch since the
Progressive Era.233 While the unitary theory offered a facially originalist
argument about constitutional text, it also relied on the living, Progressive
understanding that the President was the people’s direct representative, which
had been largely absent from the Founding.234 In his partial concurrence and
dissent in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,235 Rehnquist argued that the
President’s democratic mandate ought to influence and constrain judicial review
of agency policy making: “A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”236
This position entered the doctrinal mainstream in Chevron, where Justice

229. Noah A. Rosenblum, The Antifascist Roots of Presidential Administration, COLUM. L. REV. 52–53
(forthcoming 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
230. The President’s Committee on Administrative Management, Administrative Management in the
Government of the United States 2 (1937).
231. Id.
232. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENT: THE POLITICS OF
LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 29–32 (1991) (1960).
233. See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual Investment
in the Unitary Executive Theory, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 197, 201–10 (2011); Stephen Skowronek, The
Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2096–2100 (2009).
234. Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation, 55 Op. O.L.C. 59, 60–61 (1981) (“[B]ecause
the president is the only elected official with a national constituency, he is uniquely situated to design and execute
a uniform method of undertaking regulatory initiatives that responds to the will of the public as a whole.”). See
SKOWRONEK ET AL., supra note 216 at 29–38.
235. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
236. Id. at 59.
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Stevens defended judicial deference in part on the grounds that the “Chief
Executive,” unlike the courts, is “accountable to the people.”237
Roberts’ attribution of democratic motives to the Framers’ theory of the
Executive thus reimagines a long line of political development as something that
had been there in the constitutional text all along. In doing so, he incorporates a
democratic theory of the Executive to strengthen the argument that the President
ought to control administrative agencies. Given that the constitutional text alone
does not resolve specific questions about issues such as at-will removal,
executive democracy buttresses available but contestable textual and structural
inferences in favor of heightened presidential power.
III. FAILURES OF THE ROBERTS COURT:
FALSE CONNECTIONS AND UNACKNOWLEDGED TRADEOFFS
The previous Part has disentangled three aspects of liberty and three
aspects of democracy that are at work in the Supreme Court’s recent public law
jurisprudence. This Part now focuses on shortcomings in the way the Court
reasons from these values. These shortcomings lead to significant distortions in
public law. The conservative Justices have incorrectly assumed that the
Executive will reliably protect individual liberty. They have not squared their
emphasis on legislative democracy in cases about nondelegation with their
emphasis on executive democracy in cases about removal. And they have not
recognized that administrative regulation may increase individuals’ capacity to
pursue their plans even if it constrains their discretionary choices. These
mistakes, inconsistencies, and unobserved tradeoffs are problematic because
they undermine the doctrinal integrity of public law. Political theory seems to
be invoked ad hoc, rather than applied evenhandedly across the cases. The Court
second-guesses legislative and administrative decisions on the basis of specious
reasoning.
The analysis that follows naturally implicates the principle of the
separation of powers. While the meaning and concrete legal implications of
Montesquieu’s tripartite scheme are heavily contested,238 the Court frequently
treats this structure as implicating liberty and democracy.239 By looking beneath
the separation of powers to the underlying concerns of freedom and selfgovernment, this Part shows that the Court has made bad inferences about how
237. 467 U.S. at 865.
238. See, e.g., W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 128 (1965) (“separation
of powers theorists—and even the same theorist at different times—have not been agreed about the institutional
arrangements which satisfy the requirements of the doctrine.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and
Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 605–06 (2001) (rejecting the traditional focus
on “branches” and “powers,” and instead arguing that the more general “diffusion of state power is more than
sufficient to put to rest any concerns about dangerous concentrations of government authority”).
239. Aziz Q. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE
L.J. 346, 380–87 (2016) (showing that the separation of powers case law aims to advance norms of liberty,
effective administration, democratic accountability, the rule of law, and protection against tyranny).
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to promote these values through specific institutional rules. In doing so, it has
aggrandized itself at the expense of the elected branches, thus disserving the
system of separated power it purports to honor.
A. THE DANGEROUS MYTH OF THE LIBERTARIAN EXECUTIVE
The Justices incorrectly assume executive democracy will consistently
protect discretionary liberty. Because this assumption is unfounded, the
jurisprudence unduly expands executive power.
In arguing against the constitutionality of the CFPB’s leadership structure,
Roberts quotes Hamilton for the proposition that “the Framers deemed an
energetic executive essential to . . . ‘the protection of property,’ and ‘the security
of liberty.’”240 The original passage is more evocative. “Energy in the
executive,” Hamilton said, is “essential . . . to the protection of property against
those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against enterprises and
assaults of ambition, of faction and anarchy.”241 The perspective here is very
much one of law enforcement, understood as the protection of discretionary
liberties against forceful invasion.242 The view of the President as a policeman
out to protect property owners has cropped up through history, for example in
the Pierce Administration’s implementation of the Fugitive Slave Act,243 or in
the Cleveland Administration’s use of federal troops to break a railroad union
strike,244 or the Johnson and Nixon Administrations’ campaigns for “law and
order.” 245 Attorney General William Barr echoed this view of executive power
in a speech to the Fraternal Order of the Police: “[W]hat stands between chaos
and carnage on the one hand, and the civilized and tranquil society we all yearn
for, is the thin blue line of law enforcement. You are the ones manning the
ramparts – day in, and day out.”246
The problem with invoking executive power to protect discretionary liberty
is that there are usually discretionary liberties on both sides of social conflict.
The slave returned to bondage under the shackles of federal agents certainly lost
240. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed. 1961)).
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
242. DE DIJN, supra note 142, at 270.
243. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 110
(2013) (describing the Pierce Administration’s aggressive enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act). See Gautham
Rao, The Federal ‘Posse Comitatus’ Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 22–26 (2008) (describing federal protection of property in slaves through
executive officers, courts, as well as deputized citizens).
244. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 577 (1895); Barton C. Hacker, The United States Army as a National Police
Force: The Federal Policing of Labor Disputes, 1877–1898, 33 MIL. AFF. 255, 258 (1969).
245. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 63–95, 134–79 (2016).
246. Attorney General William P. Barr, Remarks at the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police’s 64th
National Biennial Conference, New Orleans, LA (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodge-fraternal-order-polices-64th.
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discretionary freedom at the hands of the Executive. Labor leaders jailed after
the Pullman strike lost their liberty as well, even if railroad companies gained
some of theirs.247 The application of executive power to increase the liberty of
one set of actors will often squeeze another. It is therefore impossible to say, as
a general matter, that protection of one kind of property or liberty interest
equates to an overall increase in the discretion of private parties.
Consider the ongoing controversy over contraceptive healthcare coverage
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA requires that health care plans
cover “preventive health care and screening” for women without cost sharing.248
This provision has been interpreted by both the Obama and Trump
Administrations to include contraceptive coverage.249 The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act at the same time strictly limits government’s ability to “burden
the exercise of religion.”250 Some religious groups have expressed a conscience
objection not only to providing contraceptive coverage but to becoming in any
way “complicit” in the provision of insurance plans that provide such
coverage.251 Over the past decade, the executive branch has sought to balance
these statutory mandates, with religious claimants demanding and the judiciary
requiring ever wider conscience-based exemptions and accommodations.252
Most recently, in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania,253 the Court rejected challenges to a Trump Administration
regulation that significantly broadened existing religious exemptions from the
contraceptive mandate.254 Under the Trump Administration’s approach, any
“religious nonprofit organization with sincerely held religious beliefs opposed
to contraceptive coverage” is exempt from the obligation to submit a “selfcertification” of its conscientious opposition to its insurance issuer, which would
then require the issuer to provide the contraceptive coverage at no cost to the
participants in and beneficiaries of the employer’s plan.255 The government
estimated that somewhere between 70,500 and 126,400 women would lose

247. ALMONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE: THE STORY OF A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF A GREAT
LABOR UPHEAVAL 282 (1942).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2010).
249. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). Religious
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act;
Interim Final Rule with Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 6, 2017).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018).
251. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518 (2015) (stating that the claimants in Hobby Lobby “contended
that providing insurance coverage would make them complicit with employees who might use the insurance to
purchase forms of contraception that the employers viewed as sinful”).
252. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557,
1559–61. (2016) (per curiam).
253. 140 S. Ct. 2367.
254. Id. at 2370.
255. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,796, 47,802 (Oct. 13, 2017).
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access to no-cost contraceptive coverage as a consequence of this policy
change.256
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s analysis “casts
totally aside” the statutorily protected interests of women “in its zeal to protect
religious rights to the nth degree.”257 Note how this case pits one set of
discretionary liberty interests against another: those of women versus those of
employers. Under the Trump Administration’s rule, the liberty of women to
obtain contraceptive coverage constricts. The discretionary liberty of employers
to determine the contents of their health insurance plans simultaneously
expands. This adjustment in the spheres of discretion happens not because of
purely “private” agreements but because of the way in which legal institutions
have purposefully constructed the healthcare system.258 Private discretion is
distributed as it is in part because of the way in which the Executive Branch
interprets and implements the law.
The Court’s confidence that complete presidential control of administration
will result in the protection of liberty is insensitive to these kinds of differential
liberty impacts. The Justices rely on what Ganesh Sitaraman and Ariel Dobkin
aptly describes as the “Safeguard of Liberty Fallacy,” which disregards the
competing liberty interests that are typically at issue in administrative action.259
The conservative wing typically focuses myopically on the governmental
constraint of particular classes of private rights, such as property, corporate,
religious interests, while giving short shrift to others, such as reproductive
autonomy or consumer protection. But it is very difficult if not impossible to
generalize about how the exercise of executive power will impact discretionary
liberty overall when the law protects many kinds of potentially antagonistic
personal interests, and the executive has some choice as to which interests it will
protect and how. The example of contraceptive coverage shows how executive
agencies’ interpretations are likely to shift along with the social and regulatory
philosophy of the incumbent President. But these shifts do not promote
discretionary liberty interests on the whole in any reliable way.
Even if there were cases where the sum of individual discretion rested
squarely on one side and the dictates of government policy on the other, there is
no guarantee that presidential power will favor the former over the latter. Some
presidents may follow the Reagan paradigm and aim to increase the discretion
256. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536, 57,578, 57,580 (Nov. 15, 2018); Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct.
at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
257. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926, 1934–36 (2019)
(describing how the market-based structure of private health insurance is publicly managed, regulated, and
bureaucratized).
259. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ariel Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and Multimember
Commissions, 71 ADMIN. L REV. 719, 735–37 (2019) (“We are hardpressed to think of a single regulation that
does not at once enhance the liberty of some groups and infringe on the liberty of others.”); see also Ganesh
Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV. 352, 398–99 (2020).

412

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

of property holders and decrease the scope and intensity of regulatory
controls.260 Others will follow Franklin Roosevelt’s paradigm and limit the
discretion of property owners through regulation.261 Most will do some of both,
giving a wide berth to some private rights that they consider most politically
valuable and subjecting others to managerial control.
The competing liberties at issue in executive action are most obvious in the
realms of prosecution and law enforcement. Justice Scalia recognized “the vast
power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a
prosecutor.”262 But he goes on to argue that the “the purpose of . . . the unitary
Executive” was, in part “to preserve individual freedom”263 by constraining such
prosecutorial discretion through political accountability. That kind of control
may work if prosecutors should be foolish (or courageous) enough to enforce
the law against some prominent majoritarian interest. But it will provide very
little security in the cases where discretionary liberty is most seriously in peril,
such as those involving “discrete and insular minorities.”264 If our goal is to
protect individual freedom against government overreach, maximizing the
enforcement powers of a politically accountable executive is a perverse remedy.
The myth of the libertarian executive has been deployed to justify the
accrual of power to the President and the invalidation of statutory provisions that
separate enforcement and regulatory decisions from the president’s unilateral
will. These moves pose all manner of serious threats to the discretionary liberties
they purport to protect. A president with unfettered power to control the vast
powers of the administrative state as he wishes can target political adversaries,
voters, or religious minorities for prosecution, exclusion, or other differential
treatment. We have seen some of these worries materialize during the Trump
Administration,265 at times with the Court’s approval or at least acquiescence.266
The Court has failed to reckon with the ways that executive power may threaten
the discretionary liberties of private persons.

260. See generally MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2000) (describing deregulatory initiatives during the Reagan
Administration).
261. See THEDA SKOCPOL, ANALYZING AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS IT HAPPENS, IN THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 48, 54 (2016) (comparing the success between
Roosevelt and Obama’s regulatory agendas).
262. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
265. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the Census
Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenshipquestion-hofeller.html; Natasha Bertrand, Trump’s Yearning to Prosecute His Political Enemies, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/trump-reportedly-wanted-prosecutehillary-and-comey/576460.
266. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018).
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B. WARRING DEMOCRACIES: THE LEGISLATURE VERSUS THE EXECUTIVE
In their removal and nondelegation opinions from Morrison and the
Benzene Case to Seila Law and Gundy, the conservative Justices invoke
democracy in one of two ways, without acknowledging that a fair accounting of
democratic impacts requires consideration of both. In the removal cases, they
stress the democratic powers of the President without acknowledging the
competing democratic claims of Congress. In the nondelegation cases, they
stress the democratic powers of Congress while ignoring those of the President.
Using such blinkered reasoning, the Justices improperly aggrandize judicial and
presidential power at the expense of the administrative state Congress has
enacted through countless rounds of legislation since the Founding.267
Recall that Chief Justice Roberts, in Seila Law, claims that “the Framers
made the President the most democratic and politically accountable official.”268
As shown in Part II, this claim reflects neither the Framers’ intent nor the
Constitution’s original public meaning, since the Constitution as initially
conceived insulated the President from popular politics. The democratic features
of the presidency today are rather the product of innovations in the Jacksonian
and Progressive Era that forged a link between the President and the people as a
whole. Without acknowledging this historical pedigree, Roberts aims to institute
a unitary executive that promotes democratic control through the President’s
electoral accountability to the people. The single-Director structure of the CFPB
was particularly problematic because “an unlucky President might get elected
on a consumer-protection platform and enter office only to find herself saddled
with a holdover Director from a competing political party who is dead set against
that agenda.”269 The people’s control of financial regulatory issues would be
impaired by the President’s inability to install a Director who agreed with her
program.
This argument is reasonable as far as it goes. However, Roberts does not
acknowledge the force of democratic considerations weighing against
maximizing the President’s control over law’s administration. The CFPB, after
all, did not arrive ex nihilo. Congress created the CFPB as an “independent
bureau,” insulated from presidential control.270 And Congress, like the President,
has its own claims to democratic legitimacy, which have been recognized in
Supreme Court jurisprudence on nondelegation. Justice Gorsuch, who joined
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court in Seila Law, referred in Gundy to
the importance of maintaining the legislative power that is “reserved for the
people’s representatives.”271 It is in part because of what Justice Thomas calls

267. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
268. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203.
269. Id. at 2204 (emphasis omitted).
270. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a), (c)(3) (2018).
271. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Congress’s “accountability” that the conservative Justices stress the importance
of Congress making the important policy choices, rather than delegating these
to executive agencies.272 If the Court were consistent in its application of
democratic values across public law, it would have to weigh the democratic
benefits of Congress’s power to structure agencies against the democratic
benefits of maximal presidential control. It has not done so.
It is not at all clear how one would conduct such judicial balancing, given
that the democratic credentials of both branches are imperfect.273 The President
usually claims a majority of the popular vote, but not always, and especially not
since 2000.274 Historically, constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment and dynamics of political competition have usually resulted in
“broad majorities” in favor of major legislation, which often reflects a “public
mood” of intense mobilization amongst the citizenry.275 But the Senate is not a
majoritarian institution, as the equal representation of the states is likely to skew
legislation towards the interests of voters in less populous states.276 The Senate
filibuster compounds the damage.277 In addition, it is not obvious, without
developing a more robust theory of democracy, how to weigh the democratic
authority of past publics to make law through Congress with the democratic
authority of present publics to make policy through the Executive.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to resolve such thorny issues. The
point is that the Justices have not even acknowledged them. The failure to reckon
with legislative democracy in cases concerning removal creates the misleading
impression that the people only benefit from enhanced presidential control over
the executive. By the lights of the Justices’ own positions in other cases,
however, there is a direct democratic tradeoff between constitutional rules
mandating presidential control over the Executive, on the one hand, and
maintenance of the legislative powers of Congress, on the other.
The Court therefore does not promote democracy when it invalidates
statutes enacted by the people’s representatives to insulate agencies from the
elected president. It rather shifts democratic power from general lawmaking to
the plebiscitary discretion of the Chief Executive. In relocating authority in this
way, the Court simultaneously arrogates power to itself—a body of unelected
and tenured officials who are insulated from popular accountability for their

272. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
273. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s functional balancing
approach to the separation of powers as lacking manageable standards).
274. Brian J. Gaines, Popular Myths About Popular Vote-Electoral College Splits, 34 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 70, 75 (2001); Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html.
275. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS,
1946–2002, 130–35, 159–60 (2d ed., 2002).
276. Thomas L. Brunell, Partisan Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections, 1952–1996: Why the Senate is
Usually More Republican Than the House of Representatives, 27 AM. POL. Q. 316, 332 (1999).
277. David R. Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003).
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decisions. On the whole, judicial interference here would seem to decrease rather
than promote democratic control.
An equal and opposite problem arises in the nondelegation cases. Justices
Rehnquist, Thomas, and Gorsuch have all invoked legislative accountability to
the people as a reason to restrict Congress’s ability to delegate policy choices
concerning private rights to the Executive.278 But the Justices fall silent when it
comes to recognizing the value each of them has elsewhere recognized of
executive democracy.279 Consider the reasoning in Gorsuch’s dissent in
Gundy.280 Joined by Thomas and Roberts, Gorsuch noted that the statute at issue
undermined the constitutional requirement that “only the people’s elected
representatives may adopt new federal laws.”281 Gorsuch claimed the statute
subverted this democratic principle because it “purports to endow the nation’s
chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code.”282 This
argument is in serious tension with the reasoning of Seila Law, where Gorsuch
and Thomas joined Roberts’ opinion holding that the President is the nation’s
“most democratic official,” and that the President’s power to remove officials
means that he has the power to “control” them.283 The attorney general is
removable by the President at will. On these Justices’ understanding, then, the
attorney general’s official action is thoroughly subject to command of the
nation’s “most democratic official.” There should therefore be no meaningful
loss to the rulemaking prerogatives of “the people’s representatives” if the
attorney general “specifies the applicability” of a criminal statute.284 If we take
seriously these Justices’ democratic understanding of the President and unitary
and hierarchical understanding of the executive branch, then legislative
delegation to principal officers like the attorney general whom the president
appoints and can remove at will poses little, if any, problem for democratic
legitimacy. That is because the President may dictate what these subordinate
officers do. Any shortfalls in legislative democracy would then be compensated
for by the democratic credentials of the Chief Executive.
It could be argued that the Executive Branch on the whole has weaker
democratic credentials than Congress, making legislative delegation to
executive officials harmful to democracy. The president, after all, is rarely the

278. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
279. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (Roberts, C.J.
opinion for the Court, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch).
280. 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (“individual executive officials will still wield significant authority,
but that authority remains subject to the ongoing supervision and control of the elected President.”). Id. at 2218
(Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.) (“The President therefore must have ‘power to remove—and
thus supervise—those who wield executive power on his behalf.’”); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
284. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting); Id. at 2122 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20913).
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one to make the relevant executive decisions.285 Instead, policy decisions are
usually made by appointed officials, and these officials rely in turn on the input
and expertise of subordinates. That hierarchical structure is arguably less firmly
connected to the people than the equal voting rights of the members of Congress
and the Senate. On the other hand, individual legislators rarely make policy
decisions either, but rather delegate those responsibilities to party leadership.286
Furthermore, the Senate and the House of Representatives do not always act as
a body, but instead delegate many powers to committees, where seniority rules
and jurisdictional rights create hierarchies amongst the members.287 Given these
institutional realities, it is not obvious, without relying on a controversial theory
of constitutional democracy, that one imperfectly democratic institution is more
closely connected to the people than the other.
Suppose it is true that legislation is more closely connected to the people
than is executive decision-making. If that is so, the democratic arguments the
conservative Justices have deployed in favor of the unitary executive are that
much weaker. If even a thoroughly hierarchical and unified executive could not
eliminate significant slack between the people’s interests and the executive
decisions made on their behalf, the superior democratic competency of Congress
would justify insulating executive officials from presidential control or
otherwise constraining the way in which executive branch decisions are made.
It would increase overall democratic legitimacy to tie agencies more closely to
congressional preferences than to a president whose democratic credentials are
comparatively weaker.288
The conservative Justices do not acknowledge the deep tension between
their democratic critique of legislative delegation and the democratic critique of
statutorily mandated administrative independence from the President. The result
of this internally inconsistent reasoning is that the Court unjustifiably enhances
its own power to invalidate and revise legislation at the expense of the power of
the elected branches to make and implement law. The conservative Justices rely
on democratic principles to limit Congress’s power to delegate to the executive
and to enhance the President’s power over administrative agencies. All the
while, this democratic rhetoric reallocates power to the branch of government

285. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191 (“Because no single person could fulfill [the obligation to faithfully
execute the laws] the Framers expected that the President would rely on subordinate officers . . . .”) (alteration
in original).
286. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312,
2337–38 (2006).
287. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143 (1988).
288. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 592 (1984) (suggesting that there “may be a greater intensity of congressional political
oversight” of independent agencies over executive agencies. “[A]s a former FTC Chairman recently remarked,
the independent agencies ‘have no lifeline to the White House. [They] are naked before Congress, without
protection there.’”).
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that usually plays what Justice Scalia once called the “undemocratic role” of
safeguarding individuals and minorities against majority rule.289
The Justices might respond to this line of critique by retreating to a
formalist posture. They might assert that rules concerning removal and
delegation are based upon the categorically distinct definitions of “legislative”
and “executive” power. The problem with such a reply is that it is utterly nonresponsive to the political theory arguments the Justices repeatedly rely on. If
the only true ground of these opinions are formal conceptions of what powers
are supposedly legislative or executive in their nature, then all of the Justices
references to “the people,” “democracy,” and “liberty” not only carry no
justificatory weight but, worse, have apparently been offered in bad faith. If we
take these normative arguments in good faith, by contrast, the formalist response
is inadequate to address the underlying issues of political morality. We remain
at the mercy of judicially crafted constitutional rules that set the boundaries
between legislative and executive power on the basis of inadequate, erroneous,
and inconsistent arguments.
Such unwarranted judicial interference with the powers of the elected
branches constitutes “encroachment or aggrandizement” by the judiciary “at the
expense of” the legislative and executive.290 The system of checks and balances
is meant primarily to be a “self-executing safeguard” rather than a roving license
for the courts to second-guess institutional design choices of elected officials in
the absence of clear textual violations.291 Congress and, to a lesser extent, the
President have constitutional authority to decide how the execution of law
should be structured.292 Aggressive judicial superintendence of the relationship
between the political branches therefore upsets the allocation of institutional
roles that the Constitution adopted by the people contemplates.
C. THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY AND RATIONAL LIBERTY
I showed in Part II that there are some cases where the conservative Justices
invoke liberty as discretionary choice where the law is silent, and others where
they understand liberty as rational action in reliance on known and stable rules.
In cases concerning agency independence, Roberts in Seila Law and Kavanaugh
in PHH Corp. were concerned about how a regulatory agency may infringe on
discretionary liberty, in the sense that it may impose new rules on financial
289. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element in the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).
290. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
291. Id.; See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s
rule against Congressional participation in removal of executive officers is “insensitive to our constitutional
role . . . . [S]uch matters are for the most part to be worked out between the Congress and the President through
the legislative process, which affords each branch ample opportunity to defend its interests”).
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper to carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 16 (1974).
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transactions between private parties.293 By contrast, rational liberty was at issue
in Gutierrez-Brizuela, where Gorsuch was concerned with how judicial
deference to agencies’ legal interpretations leaves private parties uncertain about
legal rules, and to “guess” what they are.294 These two kinds of liberty place
opposing pressures on the structure of administrative agencies and principles of
judicial review: Do we want to leave people relatively free from legal coercion,
or do we want to coerce them in ways that are known and relatively stable so as
to facilitate each person’s reasoned decision-making? Administrative regulation
often imposes costs on the former discretionary aspect of liberty in order to
benefit people’s rational liberty to act against the background of specific and
enforced norms. The Justices who are the most prone to invoke liberty do not
acknowledge this tradeoff, however. As a consequence, the jurisprudence
neither acknowledges the ways in which regulation can promote rational liberty,
nor develops legal rules that are well tailored to address legitimate threats to this
form of liberty.
Consider how rational and discretionary liberty may come apart in
transactions in the marketplace. Suppose that a consumer refinances their current
fixed-rate mortgage with a complex mortgage product, such as a hybrid
adjustable-rate mortgage, to reduce current monthly payments. The consumer
has not thought through all the terms and the financial risks associated with this
mortgage product, in particular the possibility of considerably higher future
payments. Though nothing in the marketing or sales process would constitute
fraud, a reasonable person could misunderstand the terms because of the nature
of the advertisement, the sales pitch, and the agreement itself. Suppose, further,
that the consumer would not have purchased the loan if the mortgage contract
and accompanying documents had been clear about the extent to which future
payments could increase. The mortgage agreement in this situation would be at
the purchaser and seller’s discretionary liberty to the extent that both parties
chose to enter into the agreement without any specific or willful coercion by the
other, and without the government dictating that the loan must be transacted or
the precise terms on which it must be transacted. To be sure, both parties operate
under the ambient coercive pressures related to the interest rates available, the
government’s backing of the mortgage market, and the general rules of contract
law. Their discretion is far from absolute. But the point here is that there remains
some zone of choice in which the consumer may choose to purchase the loan or
not, and the seller may choose whether or not to sell. When Roberts and
Kavanaugh worry about liberty in the CFPB cases, they are concerned about
preserving this kind of liberty of contract from government intrusion. They
emphasize the value of letting people do as they please while being forced to
accept consequences of what they willingly agree to.
293. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), abrogated by Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct.
2183 (2020); Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
294. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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It might nonetheless be argued that the purchaser did not really make a
“free” choice in the situation just described—they did not completely understand
what they were signing up for. This is a concern for what I’ve called rational
liberty, the liberty to make and carry out decisions in light of clear and relatively
fixed rules. Here the focus is on whether the parties really understood the terms
they bound themselves to and the likely future consequences of that choice. To
facilitate this kind of liberty, the law might require loan disclosure forms that
simply explain the most important and potentially risky aspects of a loan, which
might otherwise be underplayed in sales materials or get lost amidst a lengthy,
small-print contract.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has in fact issued a regulation
simplifying previous disclosure requirements in consideration of “the purposes
of improving consumer awareness and understanding of transactions involving
residential mortgage loans through the use of disclosures, and the interests of
consumers and the public.”295 This regulation marginally constricts the
discretionary freedom of financial services providers, who must now issue
certain disclosures that they did not have to before, and who may lose the
business of some potential purchasers as a consequence of those mandates. Such
costs to the seller’s discretionary liberty is a benefit to the purchaser’s rational
liberty insofar as the purchaser learns material facts that had previously been
obscured. This rational liberty was what Judge Pillard touched on in PHH Corp.
when she noted that “freedom of contract . . . depends on market participants’
access to accurate information[.]”296 Incomplete information constrains rational
liberty by preventing individuals from comprehending and acting in light of the
terms of the contractual agreements they may enter into.
Regulations may also reduce uncertainty for regulated parties such as
financial service providers, and thus increase their rational liberty. CFPB thus
solicited comment on whether “the level of detail in the proposed regulations
and official interpretations (including a number of examples illustrating what is
and is not permitted) will make compliance more burdensome and whether the
Bureau should adopt a less prescriptive approach in the final rule.”297 Most
industry commenters wanted more detail, not less, 298 even if this came at the
expense of their liberty to implement the disclosure requirements in one way or
another. They presumably wanted to know precisely how to comply with the
law, not to be left uncertain about whether or not the Bureau would consider
their disclosures compliant. That kind of certainty confers rational liberty
because it makes it easier for businesses to plan their course of conduct in

295. Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and
the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730, 79,756 (Dec. 31, 2013).
296. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 106, abrogated by Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
297. Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and
the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 79,756.
298. Id.
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conformity with the rules, rather than expend time and money hazarding
imperfect guesses about how to comply.
Similar but stronger incentives arose from the Obama Administration’s
Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations setting fuel economy
standards.299 The Trump Administration rescinded those standards and replaced
it with much less stringent ones.300 And yet, several large auto manufacturers
signed on to an agreement with the State of California with only “slightly less
restrictive” economy standards than the Obama Administration’s in order to
provide “much needed regulatory certainty.”301 While part of the incentive for
this agreement was California’s statutory power to set its own standards, the
other factor was auto manufacturers’ need to make long-range plans in a capitalintensive industry.302 Auto manufacturers might prefer the Trump
Administration’s radically lower fuel economy standards, all things being equal.
But once they’ve begun to make investments in low-emissions vehicles based
on higher standards, switching to radically less onerous standards no longer has
the same appeal. They are willing to trade a degree of discretion measured in
miles per gallon for the planning benefits of a durable regulatory requirement.
They will give up the prospect of greater discretionary liberty in order to attain
greater rational liberty.
Such dynamics are also common beneath the level of regulations when
agencies issue nonbinding guidance to private parties concerning how to comply
with the law. Critics of guidance complain that these documents often impose
“coercive” requirements while avoiding the rigors of informal rulemaking or
formal adjudication.303 But in contexts where an agency has broad enforcement
power, or the capacity to keep products off the market altogether, regulated

299. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2017 and
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623 (Oct. 15, 2012).
300. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,
85 Fed. Reg. 24, 174 (Mar. 30, 2020).
301. Carol Davenport & Hiroko Tabuchi, Automakers, Rejecting Trump Pollution Rule, Strike a Deal with
California, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/climate/automakers-rejectingtrump-pollution-rule-strike-a-deal-with-california.html.
302. Umair Irfan, Trump’s EPA is Fighting California Over a Fuel Economy Rule the Auto Industry Doesn’t
Even Want, VOX (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/6/18295544/epa-california-fuel-economy-mpg
(“Automakers say that a new car requires about three to five years of development, so car companies have to
build for regulations as they’ll be in the future. That’s why no automakers have publicly supported the rollback
of fuel economy rules.”); Bill Ford & Jim Hackett, A Measure of Progress, MEDIUM (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/cityoftomorrow/a-measure-of-progress-bc34ad2b0ed (“We [Ford Motor Company]
support increasing clean car standards through 2025 and are not asking for a rollback . . . . We already have
charted a course for our future that includes investing $11 billion to put 40 hybrid and fully electric vehicle
models on the road by 2022 as well as responsible development of the self-driving car.”) (alteration in original).
303. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992).
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parties crave guidance like “water in the desert.”304 Even if the terms of the
guidance departs from the regulated parties’ ideal point in preserving their own
discretion, the gains in certainty make such non-binding yet coercive
communications well worth the cost.
Roberts and Kavanaugh’s reliance on discretionary liberty as a reason to
limit administrative power ignores the sorts of rational-liberty gains effective
regulation generates. They emphasize the importance of maximizing the options
available to financial service providers and consumers while downplaying the
importance of enabling people to understand and act in light of a stable system
of rules and guidelines. As a consequence, they favor stricter controls over
administrative agencies than would be justified by a balanced analysis of the
values they themselves have recognized in other cases.305 A Court that gave
rational liberty its fair measure would encourage agencies to issue binding
regulations to help guide conduct rather than continuously seek to reduce
administrative power in the name of private discretion. The Court’s moderate
and progressive Justices would do well to emphasize the rational liberty benefits
of administrative regulation when the conservative Justices ignore them.
IV. FURTHERING LIBERTY WITHOUT UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The previous Part examined how the conservative Justices have failed to
apply the political theory they rely on consistently and even-handedly to
controversies that concern the administrative state. This Part turns from critique
to constructive reform. It describes how the administrative state currently
advances liberty. It then suggests legal reforms that would further liberty at
minimal costs of democracy.
One might conclude from the previous Part that the values of liberty and
democracy are simply too contestable and diffuse to inform constitutional or
administrative law. To borrow Justice Holmes’s phrase from a related context,
perhaps these values are like “spiders’ webs[,] inadequate to control the
dominant facts.”306 There are indeed sound objections to the Court’s freewheeling invocation of these values in public law. Because liberty and
democracy are “polycentric” values, containing multiple and conflicting
interests, particular legal rules are likely to generate competing burdens and
benefits for each of these values that cannot easily be weighed and compared.307
304. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies
and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 185 (2019).
305. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.)
(emphasizing “stability and fair notice” as a reason for the nondelegation doctrine); Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2438
(Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Kavanaugh J. and Thomas, J.) (arguing that Auer deference leaves private
parties “unsure what the law is”).
306. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 295 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
307. Fuller, supra note 127, at 394–404 (1978).
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Many questions about how best to advance liberty and democracy in the design
of the administrative state therefore cannot be resolved by way of “judicially
discoverable and manageable standards,” but instead involve “policy
determination[s]” that the Constitution assigns to the elected branches rather
than the judiciary.308 In particular, questions about how to strike the optimal
balance between legislative and executive democracy, or between private
discretion and legal coercion, do not admit precise answers that are generalizable
across the full range of government conduct. If the Court presumes to set the
balance on its own, the result is likely to be arbitrary.
While the Roberts Court’s use of political theory to date has been
inconsistent on its own terms, it will not do to dismiss any and all reliance on
liberal and democratic values out hand. These principles animate our political
and legal culture and are now entrenched in the case law. The Court’s
acknowledgment of the substantive political values that underlie its reasoning
also promotes public scrutiny and transparency. The solution to the ails
described above is not to cease talking about liberty and democracy altogether
but rather to cabin these discussions to matters where judges have specific
competence and authority.
This Part therefore identifies those cases where political theory points the
way towards constructive judicial reforms. Subpart A describes how the
retroactive effect of agency policymaking may undermine rational liberty. This
problem falls squarely within the judiciary’s bailiwick as it implicates due
process concerns. The Court could address this problem by reserving judicial
deference for prospectively rather than retroactively binding administrative
policies. Such an approach would minimally alter the design choices of the
elected branches. Subpart B acknowledges that legislative delegation of
policymaking authority to agencies may undermine political liberty. The
judiciary could help to address the issue by strengthening existing opportunities
for public participation in the administrative process. The conservative Justices,
however, do not seem likely to take up that approach, preferring instead a broadbrushed assault on the administrative state that is more likely to hurt than to help
the cause of political liberty. The elected branches instead must act to increase
political liberty in the administrative process.
A. RATIONAL LIBERTY THROUGH JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PROSPECTIVE
AGENCY RULES
The rational liberty to act in light of known and stable rules is at issue when
Gorsuch criticizes judicial deference to agency interpretation. He argues that
liberty is infringed when private parties are left to “guess” what the law is
because the agency has significant discretion to interpret the law and change its

308. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (alteration in original); See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political
Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013).
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interpretation.309 This is a valid concern, up to a point. If the rules are obscure
or perpetually in flux, individuals will not be able to plan around them. As a
consequence, they will have difficulty leading purposeful lives as rational
agents. But Justice Gorsuch does not attend to the ways in which administrative
lawmaking can also facilitate such rational liberty. If agencies make rules that
are relatively uniform and stable, individuals are likely to have greater rational
liberty than if the courts frequently reverse agency action. Rational liberty does,
however, militate against deference to agency actions that undermine
predictability and consistency, such as retroactive interpretations and
interpretations made without due consideration of significant reliance interests.
Consider a standard case of Chevron deference: an agency promulgates a
prospective rule with the force of law interpreting an ambiguous statute. The
agency’s interpretation is not what a majority of judges on the reviewing court
would consider the best interpretation of a statute, but it is one that a majority
would consider reasonable. Under Chevron, the court will uphold the agency’s
interpretation and, barring other legal infirmities, the regulation will remain in
effect.310 If Chevron were eliminated, by contrast, then the court would set aside
the rule. Chevron thus increases the likelihood that the law will remain
consistent between the way the agency interprets it and the way the courts do. In
addition, it reduces the likelihood of circuit splits, in so far as each circuit will
have to adopt a single federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute.311
Chevron therefore promotes rational liberty by increasingly the predictability
and consistency of legal rules. Take away Chevron and there will be greater
uncertainty across jurisdictions and until an often years-long process of judicial
review winds its way through the courts.
There are other aspects of judicial deference, however, that do raise
genuine problems for rational liberty. The first is the rule in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,312 authored by Justice
Thomas, that an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute supersedes a
court’s contrary interpretation.313 There is logic to the rule in terms of Chevron
itself: if the statute is ambiguous, then a democratically accountable agency
should be able to change its interpretation from time to time within the range of
ambiguity, even if a court has previously endorsed a different one of several
reasonable interpretations.314 But that kind of political flexibility imposes a real
cost on regulated firms and beneficiaries in terms of their ability to rely on
309. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
310. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
311. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for the Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987); City of
Arlington, 569 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, J.) (Reasoning that eliminating Chevron deference for jurisdictional questions
would lead to “[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test” which “would render
the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable”). I am grateful to Chris Walker for these references.
312. 545 U.S. 967.
313. Id. at 983.
314. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).
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interpretations sanctioned by the courts. Rational liberty will be undermined
when agencies change regulations in light of which private parties have made
their plans. Of course, that cost to rational liberty is arguably imposed by the
demands of legislative democracy, as codified in statutory law requiring judicial
deference to executive agencies, as well as the demands of executive democracy,
which relies on such statutory discretion to make policy changes within the
bounds of law.
One way in which administrative law balances legislative and executive
democracy against rational liberty is to require agencies and reviewing courts to
take into account any “serious reliance interests” generated by the previous
policy when considering the lawfulness of an agency’s policy change.315 That
issue proved decisive in the Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the
University of California,316 where the Court set aside the Trump
Administration’s rescission of the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). Chief Justice Roberts observed that the
rescission memorandum “failed to address whether there was ‘legitimate
reliance’ on the DACA Memorandum.”317 He noted that “DACA recipients have
‘enrolled in degree programs, embarked on careers, started businesses,
purchased homes, and even married and had children, all in reliance’ on the
DACA program.”318 The Court’s concern to protect these reliance interests is
based on the value of rational liberty. The Court was securing DACA recipients’
ability to make and pursue plans made in light of the government’s previous
policy.319
Some of the current limits on “Chevron’s domain”320 likewise sound in
rational liberty. In United States v. Mead Corp.,321 the Court declined to grant
Chevron deference to a customs classification ruling. The Court reasoned that
these rulings did not have the force of law in part because the Customs Service’s
regulations stated that such classification rules would be “conclusive only as
between itself and the importer to whom it was issued[.]”322 The agency itself
did not mean, by such classifications, to create rules that all regulated parties
knew in advance and could rely on when making their business decisions. The
Court further observed that the classifications could not have “legal force”
because “46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each

315. Id. at 515.
316. 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913, 1915 (2020).
317. Id. at 1913.
318. Id. at 1914 (internal quotations omitted).
319. The reliance interests implicated in administrative action may go beyond pecuniary concerns to include
also the interest in the government’s recognition of one’s identity or status or the harms one has suffered. See
Emerson, supra note 77, at 2207–15.
320. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2001) (exploring
the limits of Chevron’s scope).
321. 533 U.S. 218.
322. Id. at 233.
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year.”323 Given the diffusion of power to issue classification rulings, granting
deference to one ruling could upset the plans of parties who had relied on
different advice given by other officials. Whereas deference to a rule issued by
an agency head ensures predictability and consistency in the administration of
law, deference to each one of thousands of letters issued to particular parties
from dozens of offices would risk upending any discernible pattern of customs
enforcement.
Justice Kagan’s refinement of Auer deference in Kisor follows a similar
logic in limiting deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations to
situations where the interpretation is “authoritative” rather than “ad hoc,” and
represents the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” rather than a
“convenient litigating position.”324 These constraints protect the notice and
reliance interests of private parties against unpredictable, retroactive, or
surreptitious changes in policy.
Kagan would have done well to underscore the liberty interest at issue in
these limitations on Auer deference.325 But she shied away from these issues and
focused instead on conventional administrative law concerns with bureaucratic
“expertise.”326 Justice Gorsuch then assumed the high ground of liberty, arguing
that, because of Auer deference, ordinary people would be “left always a little
unsure what the law is.”327 But if deference to agency interpretations of
regulations is limited to situations where the interpretation is prospective,
authoritative, and relatively durable, the problem of uncertainty will be
significantly diminished. Deference to such official interpretations in fact
increases certainty relative to a system where the judiciary may lightly set aside
the agency’s considered position or where the agency simply delegates wide
discretion to low-level officials to avoid the trouble of judicial scrutiny of its
guidance.328
Retroactivity nonetheless remains a significant problem in some fields of
administrative law. Interpretations issued through agency adjudications often
enjoy Chevron deference.329 The parties to the adjudication may then become
bound by an interpretation that was not previously in force and of which they
had no notice. As Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson have recently argued,
retroactive policymaking raises due process concerns about “the fairness and
political legitimacy of agency actions,” even if these worries do not amount to
actual due process violations.330 This was one of the issues Justice Gorsuch
323. Id.
324. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18.
325. Metzger, supra note 4, at 45 (“Kagan barely engaged Gorsuch’s lengthy constitutional attack on Auer,
but her dismissive response was largely functionalist.”).
326. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417.
327. Id. at 2438 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
328. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an
Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001).
329. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230.
330. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 974 (2021).
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identified in Gutierrez-Brizuela and is endemic in immigration law.331
Retroactive policy change through adjudication damages rational liberty
because it is impossible to make plans in light of rules that are not currently in
effect. And given the gravity of the interests at stake in immigration cases, such
as whether a person can lawfully remain in the United States, these impediments
to rational agency are quite serious.
Consider, for example, Attorney General Sessions’ adjudicatory decision
in Matter of A-B-,332 in which he reversed the ruling of the BIA that an applicant
qualified for asylum.333 In doing so, the Attorney General relied on Chevron to
alter the BIA’s current caselaw on who could qualify as a “member of a
particular social group” for the purposes of asylum applications.334 For the sake
of respecting the rational liberty of the party to the adjudication and any others
who had applied for asylum, it would have been preferable if the Attorney
General had issued a rule with only future effect, rather than making a retroactive
policy change by adjudication.
Scholars have proposed responding to such problems by limiting Chevron
deference in adjudication. Hickman and Nielson’s preference is to eliminate
Chevron deference altogether for policies issued through adjudication, or at least
to restrict deference to congressionally required “formal” adjudicatory
procedures.335 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher J. Walker have argued
that Chevron deference ought to be eliminated for immigration adjudication
specifically, on the grounds that immigration questions do not involve the usual
sort of scientific expertise and immigration adjudication is not particularly
deliberative.336 The analysis developed in this Article would support an
approach that is more trans-substantive than Wadhia and Walkers’ and less
absolutist than Hickman and Nielson’s. The Court should encourage agency
officials to proceed prospectively by only granting deference to prospectively
binding legal interpretations. This would follow the logic of Mead and Kisor by
restricting deference to situations where agency policymaking is less likely to
thwart private parties’ rational agency.
A global assessment of whether restraining adjudicatory policymaking in
this way would be a net benefit for liberal democracy on the whole would have
to consider costs to legislative and executive democracy that such a judicially
imposed constraint on retroactivity would impose. In the immigration context,
Congress has vested interpretive authority in the attorney general.337 Restricting
331. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021).
332. 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Attorney General Merrick Garland vacated this decision in Matter of
A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021).
333. Id. at 321 (quoting Matter of A-B-, Decision Denying Asylum Application at *8, (Immig. Ct. Dec. 1,
2015)).
334. Id. at 326–27, 331, 333 (overruling Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (B.I.A 2014)).
335. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 330, at 964.
336. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 331, at 1201–02.
337. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018).
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that authority would arguably countermand the people’s legislative choice. And
it would simultaneously undermine executive democracy by limiting the
policymaking venues open to a principal officer responsible to the President. At
the same time, the costs to legislative and executive democracy would be fairly
marginal—an agency can usually choose between making policy by rulemaking
or by adjudication.338 Limiting Chevron deference to situations where the
agency makes policy prospectively would usually not curtail agencies’ power to
specify statutory norms but rather would channel that power from adjudication
to rulemaking. This approach would also be consistent with the existing
principle that it is permissible for an agency to make a new policy through
adjudication where the adjudication imposes no “new liability” on the parties as
a function of that policy.339 Courts might continue to defer to adjudicatory
policymaking in only those situations where no new liabilities or burdens had
been imposed on the parties and there had been no showing of substantial
reliance on the prior policy.340
Another important consideration in favor of fine-tuning deference rules in
this way is that the relevant aspects of rational liberty fall squarely within the
judiciary’s core institutional competence. Rational liberty is closely linked to
due process, as such liberty depends on providing individuals with fair notice of
rules and proceedings that may impact their rights and interests.341 Furthermore,
ensuring that the law is relatively predicable, consistent, and respectful of
reliance interests goes to the very heart of principles of judicial reasoning, such
as stare decisis.342 Judges themselves aim to develop clear standards that will
ensure the integrity of adjudicatory decision-making over time.343 Given that
notice and predictability are fundamental to the judicial role and the legal craft,
the judiciary has the know-how to rely on such concerns to bound the discretion
and deference judicial doctrine affords to agencies.
The situation here is altogether different from cases where the court
purports to set the proper balance between legislative and executive power—a
question that is far removed from the maintenance of adjudicatory fairness.
Whereas the Court should be extremely reticent to second-guess such political
338. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202; Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237 (1973).
339. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295.
340. Id.
341. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
901 (1981) (“predictability, transparency, and rationality are a family of related process values that can make a
worthwhile contribution to any process participant’s sense of self-respect . . . . ‘Kafkaesque’ procedures take
away the participants’ ability to engage in rational planning about their situation, to make informed choices
among options.”); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1280–81 (1975);
Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 SO.
CAL. L. REV. 455, 455–56 (2000); Hickman & Nielson, supra note 330, at 971–77.
342. Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1711–12
(2013).
343. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1275, 1289–90 (2006).
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decisions, it would be well-justified in limiting its own deference doctrines to
situations where administrative policy is only prospective in its binding effect.
This would protect the rational liberty of parties likely to be affected by the rule,
ensuring they have sufficient notice to recalibrate their conduct in light of the
rule. The question of whether a rule would impose retroactive liabilities is
judicially manageable, at least as compared to the normatively and empirically
complex issues that arise in weighing the legislature’s democratic competence
against that of the executive.344 The judiciary could intercede here with lesser
risk of displacing the lawmaking and executory power of the people’s elected
representatives.
B. POLITICAL LIBERTY FROM NONDELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The previous Subpart argued for a more nuanced approach to protecting
rational liberty within administrative proceedings. This Subpart suggests a
similar approach to the protection of political liberty by improving opportunities
for public contestation in the administrative process. Given trends in the Court’s
jurisprudence, however, it seems unlikely the Justices will take the more modest
approach suggested. It will rather be up to the elected branches to reform
administrative proceedings to promote citizen involvement while shielding
agencies’ political processes from undue judicial interference.
Recall that political liberty refers to an individual’s capacity to influence
and contest the rules by which she is governed. In the nondelegation cases, the
conservative Justices emphasize the need to maintain such ongoing civic control
of the government. Gorsuch defends nondelegation in order to arrest the “flight
of power” from “the people’s representatives.”345 The concern here is that the
delegated authority structures of the administrative state may hamper the
people’s capacity to constrain and direct the government.
344. This is not to say that resolving questions around retroactivity is always easy, non-problematic, or
detached from other issues of political morality. See SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN, supra note
12, at 61–62 (describing complexities and differences of approach on questions of retroactivity in administrative
law); Michael Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822 (1985) (arguing that the distinction
between retroactive and prospective rules is “illusory” because any legal change may alter the economic value
of assets); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055,
1067–73 (1997) (characterizing the distinction as a “spectrum” rather than a “binary”). Rather, at least in the
administrative law context, the question of whether an agency is making a rule that “attaches new legal
consequences to conduct completed before its enactment” is relatively confined, only marginally impacts the
discretion of the elected branches, and admits reasoned elaboration. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244,
270 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted); id. (“Any test of retroactivity will leave room for
disagreement in hard cases . . . . However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have
sound . . . instinct[s], and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations
offer sound guidance.”). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive account of thorny
issues of retroactivity, courts may rely upon the underlying value of rational liberty to inform inquiry at the
boundary lines. The essential question is whether changes to the legal status of prior conduct substantially
impairs the reasoned decisionmaking of the parties whose legal interests have been impacted. See Stephen R.
Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 391 (1977) (“A [strongly] retroactive law makes it difficult or
impossible to act with knowledge of the applicable law.”).
345. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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The general concern with preserving public control over agency decisionmaking is well-justified, given the coercive power and discretion vested in the
administrative state. But nondelegation is an exceedingly poor doctrine to
address the issue. The doctrine reallocates the power to make policy decisions
from elected officials to courts. In so doing, it undermines both political liberty
and legislative democracy, rather than promoting them.
While constitutional case law recognizes the principle that the Legislature
may not delegate its legislative power, there is no firm textual basis for such a
principle. The Constitution states that the “legislative Powers . . . shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.”346 It does not say that it must remain there.347
Nor is it true that the vesting clauses would “make no sense” unless the
legislative power were nondelegable.348 One could, for instance, interpret these
clauses to grant each of the branches a sort of public entitlement, which they
may use as bargaining chips in constitutional negotiation with one another.349
Moreover, Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley have recently
concluded from exhaustive historical research that the Constitution’s vesting
clauses were not understood to create any sort of constitutional rule against the
delegation of policymaking authority to the executive.350 Nicholas Parrillo has
identified a particularly impressive statutory example of legislative delegation
in the direct tax of 1798.351 Ilan Wurman pushes back against these scholars
conclusions, arguing that some of the Founders did support the nondelegation
doctrine, and understood that Congress could not delegate “important subjects”
to the executive.352
It is not necessary to resolve this dispute here. The point for this Article’s
purposes is only that the nondelegation doctrine is at best highly contested on an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. Nor is the nondelegation
doctrine adequately justified on the democratic grounds, at least if one adopts
the conservative Justices’ unitary theory that the elected president controls the

346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
347. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (the Vesting Clauses of article I and II of the
Constitution “do not purport to limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others”).
348. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 340 (2002); Gundy, 139 S. Ct.
at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
349. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1621–24 (2014).
350. Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
367 (2021); see also Kurt Eggers, Originalism Isn’t What it Used to Be: The Nondelegation Doctrine,
Originalism, and Government by the Judiciary, 24 CHAPMAN L. REV. 707 (2021) (arguing against the originalist
case for the nondelegation doctrine in light of debates concerning the Vesting Clauses, the rejection of a proposed
Council of Revision, and John Locke’s lack of influence over the Federalists).
351. Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory
Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1302
(2021).
352. See, e.g., Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) (quoting
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825)).
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executive branch.353 As discussed in Part III, delegating policymaking power
from the elected legislature to a principal officer directed and controlled by the
elected President would not appear to pose any serious problems for democratic
accountability.
The firmest ground for the nondelegation doctrine is rather the value of
political liberty. Justice Gorsuch recognized this when he worried that legislative
delegation would turn the executive branch “into a vortex of authority that was
constitutionally reserved for the people’s representatives in order to protect their
liberties.”354 There is a legitimate concern that, if Congress authorizes agencies
to act under very open-ended or vague standards, the connection between the
people and their government will get broken or at least badly attenuated. The
people cannot control government by electing legislators if the laws enacted do
not meaningfully control the conduct of officials. Administrative agencies may
respond to the will of the elected President in a general way, which assuages
democratic concerns. But the President’s will is only very distantly connected to
each individuals’ political interests and judgments on any given topic.355
Whereas vocal and active citizens might perhaps bend the ear of their
representatives in Congress, their individualized influence over executive
agencies by way of the elected President is so weak as to be fictional.356
If our hope is to enable the people to govern themselves on an ongoing
basis, however, the enhanced nondelegation doctrine the conservative Justices
propose is a very poor tool. Justice Gorsuch would significantly tighten the
nondelegation standards, so as to ensure that Congress has “ma[de] the policy
decisions” or at least “announced the controlling general policy,” while leaving
the executive only to “fill up the details” or else to make factual findings that
trigger legal consequences.357 The problem with this proposal is that the line
between “policy” and “detail” or “fact” is, at best, extraordinarily murky in the
regulatory context. The Clean Air Act, for instance, requires the EPA to set
“ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator, based on [air quality criteria reflecting the latest
scientific knowledge] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite
to protect the public health.”358 Justice Scalia held that this provision set out an
353. See supra Part III.A. Elsewhere I have argued that non-delegation, and its cousin, the major questions
doctrine, purports to be justified on the basis of popular sovereignty. See Emerson, Administrative Answers to
Major Questions, supra note 14, at 2041–49. I argued that both doctrines do not in fact promote democracy and
have suggested procedural alternatives.
354. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
355. MASHAW, supra note 20, at 170 (“Voters should not be understood to have ratified all of the president’s
pet political projects.”); see also Robert A. Dahl, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 355, 365
(1990) (“The myth of the mandate fosters the belief that the particular interests of the diverse human beings who
form the citizen body in a large, complex, and pluralistic country like ours constitute no legitimate element in
the general good.”).
356. On individualized influence and political liberty, see PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 229–39 (2012).
357. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2), 7409(b)(1).
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“intelligible principle” so as to avoid an impermissible delegation of legislative
power.359 But would it fail Justice Gorsuch’s “controlling general policy”
standard? The statutory provision certainly contains general policies of
“adequate safety” and “public health,” but these are sufficiently open-ended as
to leave the EPA’s appointed political leadership a significant degree of
discretion over where precisely to set pollution thresholds.360 How much policy
detail is sufficient to be “controlling” but nonetheless “general” would seem to
be in the eye of the beholder. In the absence of a bright-line rule, the courts
themselves will make discretionary decisions about the best place to draw the
line between “policy” and “detail” or “fact.”361 The courts would then arrogate
to themselves a policymaking power, which nondelegation proponents consider
to be legislative. This would be delegation by judicial dictate, rather than
delegation by Congressional choice—hardly a victory for the project of selfgovernance.
A much more promising way to secure the people’s freedom from rules
over which they have no say is to structure the administrative process in ways
that facilitate participation and contestation by affected parties. That way, even
if control through legislative standards leaves much to be desired, the public can
exercise influence in agency proceedings. A similar approach was once central
to the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence. When the Court in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States362 struck down provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act delegating power to create industrial codes under the
highly malleable standard of “fair competition,” the Court emphasized the
absence of procedural controls that were present in other extant administrative
institutions, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).363 The FTC had a
similarly broad mandate to regulate “unfair methods of competition.”364 But the
Commission’s broad powers did not pose a nondelegation problem in part
because it was held to higher standards of procedural rigor, including
requirements of “notice and hearing” and judicial review.365
Congress responded to this ruling and other constitutional challenges to the
administrative process by enhancing the procedural quality of agency decision359. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
360. See WENDY WAGER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES,
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 30–41 (Feb. 18, 2013),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_
0.pdf (describing separation of science from policy judgment in the ambient air quality standards process).
361. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55
(1927) (“In truth, the distinction between ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact’ really gives little help in
determining how far courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction . . . . Matters
of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of law.
The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the court chooses to draw the line
between public interest and private right.”).
362. 295 U.S. 495.
363. Id. at 522.
364. Id. at 533.
365. Id.
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making.366 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) applied such
protections generally, requiring more onerous standards in formal adjudication,
but nonetheless insisting upon notice, opportunity for comment, and judicial
review on the basis of the administrative record in cases of informal
rulemaking.367 As discussed above,368 the 1960s and 1970s saw the courts
elaborating on these statutory protections to secure broad rights to participate in
administrative proceedings and to secure judicial review by beneficiaries. Notice
and comment then served as a distinctive avenue for the exercise of political
liberty. Agencies are required to respond to comments, and the adequacy of their
response can be contested upon review.369 These protections enable affected
parties to press their interests before the agency and to insist that the agency’s
decision be well-reasoned. Concerns that legislative delegation might threaten
liberty have been addressed by creating quasi-legislative fora within agencies
where parties can assert their rights.
For all the benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking, however, the
process as it exists today is often skewed towards the interests of sophisticated,
regulated interests and away from the interests of the general public.370 There is
arguably good reason to condition legislative delegation on further
improvements to public participation in administrative policymaking. By reenforcing statutory requirements such as administrative responsiveness to public
comments, the judiciary could ensure that affected parties constrain and
influence agency regulation.
Recognizing the implicit constitutional function of ordinary administrative
law would give significant power to the judiciary to safeguard and modulate the
administrative process.371 But this form of judicial intervention, even when
improvidently exercised, would be a much less serious threat to political liberty
than the reinvigorated but unbounded nondelegation doctrine advocated by
Justice Gorsuch. His proposed nondelegation doctrine would take a scythe to the
institutions of government that the people’s representatives have erected over
the past century and a half. Judicial superintendence of administrative
policymaking is much more precise. It may restrict and channel how agencies
proceed, and invalidate certain exercises of power, while leaving the
administrative state as a whole intact. These more fine-tuned adjustments pose
less serious risks to the people’s democratic choices, while holding out the

366. See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN
AMERICA, 1900–1940 137 (2014).
367. 5 U.S.C. § 553–54.
368. See supra Part II.A.3.
369. United States. v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
370. See sources cited supra note 154.
371. On how ordinary administrative law responds to nondelegation concerns, see Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010); Kevin M.
Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958–59 (2007).
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promise of an administrative process that fosters rather than undermines their
political liberty.
The conservative wing of the Court has often moved in the opposite
direction, however. It has taken an exceedingly broad view of agencies’
discretion to sidestep the interests of regulatory beneficiaries in cases on
standing,372 on the availability of review,373 and on agency decisions not to bring
enforcement actions.374 Most recently, in Little Sisters of the Poor, Justice
Thomas read statutory language providing that health insurers must provide
“such additional preventive care . . . as provided for in comprehensive
guidelines” issued by the Health Resources and Services Administration as
granting that agency “virtually unbridled discretion.”375 This reading is in
conflict with the APA, which requires agency action not to be “arbitrary” or
“capricious,” even where statutory language is broad.376 Justice Thomas’
approach would seem to maximize the threat that administrative arbitrariness
poses so as to heighten the perception that agencies’ authority is illegitimate. He
seemed positively disappointed that “[n]o party has pressed a constitutional
challenge to the breadth of the delegation involved here.”377
The opinion also creates bad precedent on the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process. The agency in this case proceeded by issuing an interim
final rule rather than going through the usual process of issuing a notice of
proposed rulemaking and accepting and responding to comments from the
public before finalizing the rule. According to the APA, agencies can only
proceed in this manner if they have “good cause.”378 Thomas approved of the
agency’s use of an interim final rule in lieu of a notice of proposed rulemaking
on the grounds that the interim final rule formally met the notice-and-comment
requirements by explaining its statutory authority and soliciting comments after
the fact from the public.379
If generalized, this holding would seriously undermine the APA’s informal
rulemaking requirements.380 It would enable agencies to first issue a final,
binding regulation, rather than a proposal without binding force, and then solicit

372. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556 (1991).
373. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004).
374. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 821–22.
375. 140 S. Ct. at 2373, 2380.
376. Id. at 2398 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“An agency acting within its sphere of delegated authority can of
course flunk the test of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’”) (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015)).
377. Id. at 2382 (“No party has pressed a constitutional challenge to the breadth of the delegation involved
here.”).
378. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). The Affordable Care Act also specifically authorized interim final rulemaking
in this context. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2. See Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 566 (3d Cir.
2019). But Thomas did not rely on this point at all in his discussion.
379. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2384–86.
380. Kristin E. Hickman, Did Little Sisters of the Poor Just Gut APA Rulemaking Procedures?, OF
INTEREST: BLOG (July 8, 2020), https://ofinterest.blog/2020/07/08/did-little-sisters-of-the-poor-just-gut-aparulemaking-procedures.
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comment when the rule is already in effect.381 Interim final rulemaking may be
valuable in some contexts, especially if the agency affords greater opportunities
for comment and contestation after the rule is issued than it ordinarily would
during the comment period.382 But Justice Thomas’ approach does not offer any
such compensation. Instead, it simply removes crucial guardrails that protect the
political liberty to participate in and challenge the exercise of authority. In doing
so, it merely exacerbates the genuine risks to political liberty that Justice Thomas
and his colleagues have repeatedly warned about.
Safeguarding political liberty requires more respect for and maintenance of
the administrative process that Congress, the courts, and the Executive have
created as a space for political contestation and deliberation. Whether the
Roberts Court is willing and able to pursue that project is another matter. If the
Justices’ goal is to ensure that the people maintain the political right to influence
the rules by which they are governed, keeping the administrative process open
to public input and challenge will be much more effective than invalidating
statutes wholesale. If, on the other hand, the Justices are fundamentally
motivated to expand the discretionary liberty of some favored private parties, or
else simply to throw sand in the gears of the regulatory state, then these benefits
to political liberty will not be of real interest to them.
The Court, ultimately, is only one arena. The members of a polity
committed to political liberty ought to assume responsibility for their
fundamental values rather than leave them in judicial custody. However the
Court conducts itself, the elected branches have power to expand opportunities
for the public to inform how policy is made. It is not my task here to suggest a
comprehensive reform agenda. But consider a few of examples. MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar has suggested creation of administrative juries composed of
members of the public to provide comments on rules with the help of “regulatory
public defenders.”383 Cynthia Farina, Mary J. Newhart, and others have
recommended “online public learning and participation platform[s]” to increase
the quality of deliberative public involvement in rulemaking.384 K. Sabeel
Rahman has likewise argued that financial regulatory agencies can serve as fora
for robust public involvement, well beyond notice-and-comment rulemaking,
taking inspiration from representation-reinforcing features of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and the Community Reinvestment Act.385 Drawing
on their study of existing agency outreach practices, Michael Sant’Ambrogio

381. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (stating that the rule must be published 30 days before it goes into effect, unless good
cause exception invoked).
382. See EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW, supra note 14, at 175 (“Agencies might issue interim regulations
quickly with limited or no participation, and subsequently commence an intensive, egalitarian, and deliberative
rulemaking process, which would result in a final rule to replace the interim rule.”).
383. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 491 (2005).
384. Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie & Dan Cosley, Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 395, 396–97 (2011).
385. K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 158–63 (2016).
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and Glen Staszewski have proposed formalizing public input not merely after
the proposed rule has been issued, but when the proposal is being formulated.386
There is no shortage of reform proposals that Congress or administrative
agencies themselves might adopt to deepen existing opportunities for the public
to exercise political liberty within the administrative process.
Reforming the administrative process as a forum for the exercise of
political liberty would be costly, however. The more agencies must entertain
input and challenges from the affected public, the more time-consuming and
contested regulation becomes. One promising solution would be to scale back
judicial control of the policymaking process at the same time as we scale up
processes that safeguard political liberty. For example, pre-enforcement judicial
review of regulations is a creature of statutory law and judicial decisionmaking.387 Congress could complement expanded opportunities for robust
public involvement with provisions that limit judicial review to the enforcement
stage. This would compensate for the increased costs of safeguarding political
liberty within the administrative process. It would reduce the opportunities for
the judiciary to aggrandize its power at the expense of the people and their
representatives, as it has done in cases on removal, and as it threatens to do in
cases on the delegation of legislative power.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the values of liberty and democracy repeatedly
arise in the Court’s public law jurisprudence. But these two values are each
multifaceted, referring to multiple kinds of individual freedom and popular rule.
The Justices’ invocations of democracy in cases on nondelegation and removal
run at cross purposes and land the Court in policy questions that it is neither
equipped nor empowered to handle. Their concern with liberty, on the other
hand, points the way toward some relatively modest reforms. To protect
individuals’ ability to act in reliance on stable rules, the Court would be justified
in restricting judicial deference to cases where agencies make policy only
prospectively rather than binding parties retroactively. And to protect
individuals’ ability to participate in the administrative process, they might more
rigorously enforce the participation and reason-giving requirements of noticeand-comment rulemaking.
The analysis offered here points beyond the confines of judicial doctrine,
however, and towards the wider universe of legal actors who shape the contents
of public law—the Legislature, the Executive, and the people themselves. It is
perhaps a symptom of our distance from the practice of constitutive democracy

386. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. U. L.
REV. 793, 800 (2021).
387. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). For an argument against the presumption of
reviewability that Abbott Laboratories established, see Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of
Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014).
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that the judiciary feels the license to pronounce which governmental scheme will
best advance democracy and protect liberty. But the language of
constitutionalism is not the Court’s alone, or even primarily, to wield. The
Constitution creates three coordinate branches, and each of them hold
constitutional powers. Legislation can therefore structure administration to make
it a forum for constitutive democracy, a site in which basic political
commitments can be rethought through popular deliberation and contestation.
We have seen instances of such “administrative constitutionalism” in the past,388
as agencies interpreted welfare and regulatory laws in partnership with affected
parties to give rise to new understandings of liberty and equality.389 The Court
may resist the effort to experiment with new forms of democracy, or to expand
political and rational liberty at the expense of certain private parties’ discretion.
But the decision is not ultimately theirs. It is rather a political matter for the
people to identify what kinds of liberty and democracy we want to prioritize and
implement at this moment in the course of our public life.

388. On public participation in administrative constitutionalism, compare Sophia Z. Lee, From the History
to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON
THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109, 115 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017) with Bertrall L. Ross II,
Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 574–75 (2015).
389. EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW, supra note 14, at 149–84.

